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Armed conflicts have left numerous marks on the history of mankind and still 
continue to do so. They have resulted in considerable damage to the social and physical 
fabric of the society. Millions of people both in the past and present have been suffering 
from the consequences of this unfortunate man-made disaster. Yet we see a continuing 
trend that seems to be resistant to any change despite efforts on a global level. This study 
sets out to understand the nature of reconstruction and development after armed conflicts 
with a focus on Afghanistan. After more than a decade of expended efforts, billions of 
dollars and sacrificed lives, desired results and set objectives have not been achieved by 
the international community and the Afghan government. This process of rebuilding 
Afghanistan seems to be a non-integrated effort on the part of the international 
community and the Afghan government, which has resulted in a process of development 
and reconstruction that is unsustainable, especially after the withdrawal of the 
international forces in 2014. The aim of this study is to identify and understand the nature 
and complexity of the challenges and impediments in this process.  It attempts to
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catalogue and discuss the problems and obstacles in this process of reconstruction & 
development by establishing a conceptual framework of the main issues. 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
“Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; 
only love can do that. Hate multiplies hate, violence multiplies violence, and toughness 
multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction...The chain reaction of evil -- 
hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars -- must be broken, or we shall be plunged 
into the dark abyss of annihilation.” 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968) 
 
1.1 Background 
Contrary to the common belief, the end of Cold War did not result in a global 
peace by putting a halt to the proxy wars. The following period witnessed a series of new 
and bitter civil, ethnic, and religious wars. They have been quite destructive and have 
caused physical, social, and economic losses (Hasic, 2004). From 1946 to 2001 there 
were 225 armed conflicts (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). During this time, the period from 1989 
to 1999 has been the most intense producing some 110 armed conflicts in 73 locations 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000). These armed conflicts have disrupted and/or 
destroyed the society at all levels – from social to economic to physical to technological. 
The conflicts in Africa, the Americas, Europe, and Asia have been characterized by 
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targeting not just combatants but also civilians. This practice could also be observed in 
some of the other conflicts in history; however this has become a common war tactic 
specifically in the last half of the twentieth century. These conflicts have increased 
sectarian and ethnic violence and undermined the authority of the civil government. One 
can point to a number of these conflicts that have lasted for years and ended in unstable 
peace, sometimes still followed by periodic clashes (Weiss Fagen, 1995).  The genocide 
in Rwanda and the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia in Africa; the conflicts in Kosovo, 
Serbia and Chechnya in Europe; the prolonged Palestinian and the current Syrian conflict 
in the Middle East are some that could be mentioned here. Figure 1.1 shows the number 
of deaths caused by the armed conflicts from 1970 to 1994 in 42 countries, representing 
some 44% of the world population, which resulted in the loss of more than 12 million 
lives (Haughton, 1998).  
 
Figure  1.1. Death rates in most severely war-torn countries 1970-1994 
 (Source: J. Haughton, The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies, Harvard 1998.) 
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Conflicts have devastated a number of countries in the recent past. It has resulted 
in the complete destruction of cities (Grozny), prolonged urban warfare (Beirut), 
extended siege (Sarajevo), displacement of entire populations (Kosovo), ethnic cleansing 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), and throwing back of countries to the middle ages 
(Afghanistan) (Hasic, 2004). This destruction is followed by a process of rehabilitation 
activities entailing provision of humanitarian needs, physical restoration, political 
restructuring, economic regeneration, reconciliation, and setting a framework for 
sustainable development (Barakat and MacGinty, 2002). This process requires structured 
planning. Contrary to armed conflicts, which result in a process of negative change, 
planning aims to achieve goal driven changes through coordination of activities. 
“Planning is about problem solving, about shaping the future; it is about improving the 




Figure  1.2. Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Process 
 
The reconstruction plan of a conflict affected state is set out by the international 
community and organizations in agreement with the representatives of the conflict state 
as the conflict comes to an end. The donor community and development agencies – the 









Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Department for International 
Development (DFID) and so forth – often under the guidance of the United Nations begin 
the reconstruction and emergency relief activities as soon as the conflict ends. Haughton 
(1998) observes that the activities of the international community and development 
agencies focus on four areas: political reconstruction (moving to elections), support for 
security (retraining the police force), humanitarian relief (food) and reconstruction of 
physical infrastructure (water services, electricity and housing). The international 
community and development agencies believe that once peace has been brought to a 
conflict affected state; all efforts should be made to prevent a recurrence of another 
conflict. This approach of the international community implies that peace building is a 
requirement for development. This is an essential condition that must be prioritized over 
other relief and recovery activities (Hasic, 2004). 
This study focuses on Afghanistan which has been a stage for armed conflicts for 
more than three decades. It attempts to identify and understand the difficulties and 
challenges that have been a blockade in the process of sustainable reconstruction and 
development in the past decade; and bring to light the major problems and impediments 




Armed conflicts cause extensive damage to the economic, social, and physical 
systems of a country. Armed conflicts are a major constraint in development (Hasic, 
2004). The international community has been involved in the reconstruction and 
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development of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in 2001. Since then billions 
of dollars have been expended in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Common 
sense would suggest that with the presence of the international community and the aid 
from many donor states and organizations, the situation should have ameliorated. 
However, there has not been as much progress as either the international community or 
the Afghans themselves had hoped for.  
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world. 
Afghanistan will not meet its Millennium Development Goal targets, even on an 
extended time frame. Unemployment is currently around 30%. Over half the population 
lives in poverty, a third lacks enough to eat, and 40% of Afghan children are 
underweight. Two out of every ten children born in a rural Afghan area will die before 
their fifth birthday. Nearly five out of ten people do not have regular access to clean 
drinking water. Life expectancy is just 47 years. Over 80% of Afghans do not have 
access to reliable electricity (HM Government, 2009). Furthermore, with each passing 
day an increase in attacks from the insurgent groups has been observed. Between 2002 
and 2007 the number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks rose by nearly 
6000%, and annual international military fatalities more than tripled (Barakat and Zyck, 
2009 ).  
Both the international community and the government have been immensely 
criticized by the Afghan public for their inability to achieve better results in the 
reconstruction and development of the country. One question that can be raised is why in-
spite of all the efforts by the international community and the state institutions, desired 
results are not achieved. Despite the support of many countries and organizations, 
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Afghanistan is perceived to be heading towards a failure. Thus, the urge to understand the 
underlying roots and causes, significance and characteristics of the challenges and 
impediments is felt. This understanding would better enable the involved actors in the 
recovery process to avoid the different blockades and create a strategy and set of policies 
that would result in better outcomes. Such policies could ensure stability and 
development in the political, economic, social, educational, and infrastructural sectors 
which could prevent a relapse into violence. 
 
1.3 Statement of Purpose 
The rebuilding of Afghanistan could be seen as a process of non-integrated efforts 
lacking shared-vision carried out by the international community and state institutions. 
Such a lack of coordination has resulted in an ineffective recovery and development 
process which could push Afghanistan into another phase of violence and calamity after 
the withdrawal of the international forces in 2014. The overall goal of this study is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. The objective of this work is to identify the major factors affecting the 
process of sustainable reconstruction and development in the post-2014 Afghanistan. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study is intended to address the following research questions: 
• What are the major factors affecting the process of sustainable reconstruction and 
development in the post-2014 Afghanistan? 
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• What are the underlying issues impeding the success of Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and development program? 
• In the light of the finding s of this study, what measures could be taken to 
improve the process of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan? 
 
1.5 Research Design 
The research tools utilized for this study are the Delphi technique and case 
studies. The Delphi technique is a qualitative method that gathers data from sources 
considered expert in their respective fields. This research method was selected because of 
the complex nature of this subject and the lack of comprehensive data available. Each of 
the questions presented to the participants was intended to reveal the different aspects of 
this subject and the connections they have with each other. Therefore, this approach 
seemed to be the best method to answer the questions posed in this research and have the 
potential to shed further light on this topic based on the practical experience of people 
who are involved in the process of reconstruction and development, in particular in 
Afghanistan. 
The case studies method analyzes actual cases within specific settings to 
understand a specific problem or issue within a given context. The cases studied were of 
actual projects implemented in Afghanistan. Each case was carefully analyzed to identify 
the different issues experienced from project conception to completion. Further, this 





1.6 Disciplinary Lens 
The curiosity that led the author of this study to pose the aforementioned research 
questions is his experience. The author of this study is a graduate student in the field of 
Building Construction Management. He has worked in different capacities in the 
construction industry of Afghanistan. The challenges he experienced and observed in the 




The ideal underlying assumptions for this study are that after the withdrawal of 
the international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the situation will not deviate towards 
deterioration but rather melioration. Since corruption and insecurity are two major 
variables that could turn the situation to better or worse, it is assumed that the upcoming 
elections of 2014 would result in further peace and stability with clear accountability and 
transparency within the state institutions. In this regard, it is assumed that the ongoing 
reconciliation and peace talks with the insurgent groups will result in a productive 
outcome. Such an outcome could assist in preparing the ground for tackling issues such 
as education, gender, social equity, health, human rights, and others in the rural regions 
of Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is assumed that the international community will remain 
committed to their financial and technical support to Afghanistan after 2014 as pledged in 
the Kabul conference in 2010 and Tokyo conference in 2012. 
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that what the Afghan government 
with the assistance of more than 42 countries and other international organizations could 
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not achieve in 12 years could do it in a matter of a few years all the while when most of 
the international community will withdraw from Afghanistan after 2014. Therefore, 
realistically speaking, the overall situation of Afghanistan may improve but only 
gradually. It could take decades to fight corruption and establish accountability and 
transparency in all public and private institutions. The peace-talk between the Afghan 
government, the international community, and the Taliban, having failed once, has shown 
no progress for months, leaving the security situation as doubtful as before. Thus, it 
would be a while before peace and stability could be observed in Afghanistan given the 
uncertainties present on the ground. 
 
1.8 Limitations 
Limitations refer to restrictions in the study beyond the researchers’ control 
(Rudestam and Newton, 2001). The field of post-conflict reconstruction is still a 
developing one and there is no clear and established theoretical foundation or strict 
conceptual and operational framework for analyzing these kinds of situations (Hasic, 
2004). Due to certain restrictions, the author could not go to the field for data collection. 
As a result, data collection took place via electronic means of communication – mainly 
email. This might have resulted in the author not being able to observe the subjects’ facial 
expressions, language tones and other bodily gestures in response to certain questions 
which could have proved to be valuable while analyzing the results. Further, some of the 
subjects due to the nature of this study might not have responded to the author’s 
questions to the full extent of their knowledge because of the confidentiality and 
sensitivity related to some of the issues. Similarly, some of the individuals approached 
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for participation in this study might not have been able to participate due to either 
personal or official reasons. Some of the data used in this study has been from sources 
published by other researchers which could be less reliable, outdated and different among 
sources. Further, the project data required for this study was limited and not available on 
the databases of some organizations for general public use. This lack of project data 
could bias the results as the data available might not be completely representing the 
whole range of issues on this subject. 
1.9 Delimitations 
Delimitations imply limitations imposed deliberately on the research design 
(Rudestam and Newton, 2001). This study is delimited to the reconstruction and 
development of post-conflict states, in particular Afghanistan. In this regard, extensive 
cross country comparisons with other post-conflict states from Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
the Americas could not be done due to the sheer amount of literature available and the 
limited availability of time. Therefore, the findings of this study may only be applicable 




Post-conflict recovery – due to the complex and multifaceted nature of this term and the 
multiple disciplines involved therein – engineering, architecture, education, 
medicine, etc. – it is difficult to narrow its definition to a singular term. However, 
by its aims and objectives, it could be defined as a process to reactivate the 
economic and social development to create a peaceful environment to prevent a 
11 
 
relapse into violence. This definition may be widely agreeable to; however, it may 
be subject to change in the context of varying level of crisis and geographical 
regions (Barakat and Zyck, 2009). 
Post-conflict reconstruction – the World Bank’s definition of post-conflict reconstruction 
focuses on the needs for “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of 
society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning 
peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.” 
(World Bank, 1998). However, Hamre and Sullivan argue that besides the above 
definition provided by the World Bank, “post-conflict reconstruction includes 
providing and enhancing not only social and economic well-being and governance 
and the rule of law but also other elements of justice and reconciliation and, very 
centrally, security” (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002). 
Post-conflict stabilization – in the context of post-conflict states, stabilization refers to the 
“establishment of basic security, with humanitarian activities serving as force 
protection and public diplomacy, rather than for more comprehensive and 
customarily civilian domains such as governance and socioeconomic 
development” (Barakat and Zyck, 2009). 
Post-conflict societies – by revelation, “post-conflict societies are societies in which 
rebellion had proved to be feasible” (Collier, et al, 2008). 
Sustainable construction and development – sustainability is defined as, “that which is 
capable of being sustained” and addresses three key areas – economic, social, 
environmental. Sustainable construction and development as defined in the 
Brundtland Report is construction and development that “meets the needs of the 
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present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their 
own needs” (WCED, 1987). Within the context of this study it would refer to 
construction and development that is sustainable by the government and people of 
Afghanistan. 
Armed conflict – an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between 
two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two 
parties, at least one has to be the government of a state” (Themner & Wallensteen, 
2012). 
Civil war – Collier et al, defines four main characteristics of a civil war. “It requires that 
there is organized military action and that at least 1,000 battle-deaths resulted. In 
order to distinguish wars from genocides, massacres and pogroms, there has to be 
effective resistance – at least 5% of the deaths have been inflicted by the weaker 
party.” (Collier, et al, 2008). 
Peace building – a “set of transitional reconstruction activities undertaken in a postwar 
phase, designed to lay the foundation for longer-term developments such as 
democratization, economic development and social justice.” (Suhrke, Harpviken, 
& Strand, 2002). It could also be defined as, “actions undertaken by national or 
international actors to identify and support structures which will tend to 




State building - state building refers to the “set of actions undertaken by national and/or 
international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where 
these have been seriously eroded or are missing” (Rocha Menocal, 2011). 
Political settlement - a “political settlement is the expression of a common understanding, 
usually forged among elites, about how political power is to be organized and 
exercised, and about how the nature of the relationship between state and society 
is to be articulated” (Rocha Menocal, 2011). 
Factors and Issues – it should be noted that within the context of this study, factors and 
issues are used interchangeably. 
 
1.11 Audience of this Study 
This study is intended to serve as a source of information about the different 
aspects and relevant problems faced in the process of reconstruction and development to 
the author, the researchers and professionals involved in this field and process, and the 
general populace, particularly of Afghanistan, interested in learning about this subject. It 
is hoped that the findings of this research will prove to be valuable – no matter to how 
small a group of people – in understanding the impact of some of these issues on this 
process and the development of new ideas that could lead to improvements and efficiency 







1.12 Chapter Summary 
The intensity and frequency of the armed conflicts have increased since WWII. 
Some have been interstate while most of them have been intrastate conflicts. These 
conflicts have caused partial or complete state failures resulting in the destruction of the 
political, economic, social, environmental, and technological sectors. 
Subsequent to this destruction is the process of recovery and reconstruction. The 
international community, Non-Governmental Organizations, and donors get involved in 
this process alongside the institutions of the post-conflict state. However, due to the 
different political and other agendas of these actors, their efforts are not concentrated and 
integrated towards recovery and reconstruction. These uncoordinated efforts result in 
unsustainable practices in the reconstruction and development of the post-conflict state. 
Thus the need to identify the impediments and challenges in this process are essential. 
Forming a strategy and set of policies to avoid these impediments while channeling and 
focusing the use of resources with structured planning towards a common goal will result 
in better outcomes. 
The objective of this study is to identify and bring to light the major challenges 
and impediments faced by the process of sustainable reconstruction and development in 
Afghanistan. However, due to the complex nature of this topic and lack of widely 
available research materials, this study will be carried out with certain assumptions, 
limitations, and delimitations taken into account. This will limit the findings of this study 
to Afghanistan and regions with similar characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely 
associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. Peace is not a quick fix but a 
development process that begins and can be nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered, 
and which needs to be sustained through years of ‘post-war recovery’”. 
Dr. Barakat and Chard (2002) 
 
2.1 Conflicts 
The history of mankind has been marked by numerous conflicts. Conflicts occur 
because of the differences among people. Differences in perception, perspectives, and 
values lead to disagreements. These disagreements may be related to territory, economic 
interests, religion, culture and ideology. Disagreements may lead to tense disputes which 
may result in conflicts of different scales (Kress, 2012). Hasic states that “war, armed 
conflict, violent conflict, humanitarian war, guerrilla war, ethnic violence, civilian strife 
or political violence are all terms without precise definition and very often used 
indiscriminately to support a specific point of view” (Hasic, 2004). However, whatever 
term is used, it is certain that conflicts depress national economies and degrade many 
aspects of social life (Carlton-Ford, 2009).
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Historically, the objective of a conflict has been to control territory. However, in 
order to gain political control, insurgents design contemporary conflicts to disrupt 
ongoing day to day life (Carlton-Ford, 2009).  Conflicts of this nature target both 
civilians and combatants as seen in the wars in Africa, Central America, the Balkans and 
in parts of Asia (Hasic, 2004). Such disruptions affect all the sectors of a state – social, 
political, economic, environmental, physical and technological. 
Looking at the period from the end of Second World War (WWII) to 2011, there 
have been 248 conflicts active in 153 locations worldwide (Themner & Wallensteen, 
2012). Figure 2.1 shows the trend of armed conflicts since 1946. Of these 248 conflicts, 
more than 140 have been civil wars. The data available puts the number of casualties to 
around 20 million and the people displaced to 67 million for these wars. Comparing this 
data to that of WWII, the number of casualties are almost equivalent to half with more 
than double the number of people displaced (Panic, 2005). Among these conflicts, the 
genocide in Rwanda was one of the most intensive killing campaigns in history. The 
conflict in Caucasus resulted in the worst destruction of physical infrastructure since 
WWII. The conflict in Palestine is the most prolonged conflict of all (Hasic, 2004).  
The end of Cold War instilled the image of an ideal world in the minds of people. 
In the absence of friction and tension between states supported by one or the other of the 
world super powers – the capitalists and the communists – people began to dream. They 
dreamt of an era of peace, development, prosperity and cooperation within and between 
states. However, there were skeptics who feared the uprise of the ethnic and cultural 
conflicts in the post-Cold War era, and it turns out they were right (Panic, 2005). From 




Figure  2.1. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2011 
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012) 
 
Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Americas (Themner & Wallensteen, 2012). Table 2.1 
presents the conflicts by types from 1989 to 2011. Table 2.2 presents the conflicts by 
region for the same time period. In 2011, 37 armed conflicts were active in 30 locations. 
This figure is substantially lower than the active 50 armed conflicts recorded in the early 
1990s, while higher than the 31conflicts recorded in 2010. The increase in conflicts from 
2010 to 2011 is in fact the largest increase in the number of armed conflicts between any 
two years since 1990. This rise in the number of conflicts is partly due to the events 
related to the Arab Spring (Themner & Wallensteen, 2012).  
Although, there is no general consensus on the causes of violent conflicts among 
academicians (Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008), researchers have identified 
different factors responsible for the conflicts in different parts of the world. However, due 
to the varying nature of a conflict, factors relevant to a conflict in one region of the world 
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may not be the same to the factors identified to a conflict in another region of the world. 
Still there are some characteristics that are found to be common amongst states that have 
experienced a conflict. Panic (2005) describes three of these characteristics as follows: 
I. Poverty 
According to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) over 80 percent of the states that have experienced civil 
conflicts are in the bottom half of this list. The common economic characteristics shared 
by these states are unemployment and economic stagnation, with economic welfare and 
income security deteriorating rapidly. Over 40 – 50% of the population of these states is 
ranked as poor. As a result their levels of literacy, education, health standards and life 
expectancy are much lower than those of high or medium income states. 
II. Impoverishment, Inequality and Pessimism 
If a state is experiencing a gradual economic growth, development, and has a fair 
and just system then there would be no general feeling of civil unrest and conflict among 
people. The people would be certain that the system is working fairly for the benefit of 
all. However, this is not the case in many developing countries. There is a wide gap of 
income equality among people which has created a feeling of insecurity internationally. 
People feel less prosperous and are less optimistic about the future. This pessimism, if not 
reversed, will create a cycle of impoverishment, despair, and hate among the inhabitants 
of a state. 
Low level of development results in invariably high level of unemployment. Since 
such a situation does not affect all the sections of a society equally, it creates inequality. 





Table  2.1. Armed Conflicts by type and location, 1989-2011 
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012) 
Level of 
Conflict 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Minor 30 35 39 41 35 35 34 33 32 28 26 27 
War 13 15 13 12 10 11 7 8 7 12 13 10 
All Conflicts  43 50 52 53 45 46 41 41 39 40 39 37 
All Dyads 62 67 67 64 57 56 47 51 54 54 50 49 
All Locations 36 37 38 39 32 33 31 31 29 32 31 28 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 89-2011 
 28 26 25 25 27 28 31 32 30 27 31 89 
 8 6 5 7 5 5 4 5 6 4 6 48 
 36 32 30 32 32 33 35 37 36 31 37 137 
 48 45 41 44 38 46 44 48 45 39 50 279 
 29 24 23 24 23 24 25 27 27 25 30 81 
 
Table  2.2. Armed Conflicts by region, 1989-2011 
(Source: Themner & Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, 2012) 
Level of 
Conflict 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Europe 2 3 7 8 9 5 5 1 0 2 3 1 
Middle East 4 7 8 7 7 6 6 7 4 3 3 3 
Asia 16 21 15 20 15 16 16 18 19 16 15 17 
Africa 12 13 17 14 11 15 10 12 14 17 16 15 
Americas 9 6 5 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 
All Regions 43 50 52 53 45 46 41 41 39 40 39 37 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 89-2011 
 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 23 
 3 2 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 6 15 
 14 12 15 14 16 15 14 15 15 12 13 39 
 15 15 10 10 7 10 12 13 12 10 15 46 
 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 14 




and the system, it increases political instability and risk of conflict. Such a situation 
encourages immigration of highly skilled and educated labor along with the transfer of 
capital. This makes it even more difficult to reverse the economic decline, thus raising the 
likelihood of a conflict. Examples of states where sharp falls in income and large 
increases in unemployment preceded civil wars are Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Yugoslavia.  
III. Social Divisions and Political Oppression 
When the economic welfare and personal survival of people are threatened, they 
form alliances with people who face similar dangers to protect themselves. An 
independent and developed state will not collapse if the ‘population is homogenous and 
share the same roots, language and religion; equality prevails in the society and there is 
no discrimination against any group of the people; every member of the society has the 
same legal rights, equal access to state institutions and influence on the way they are run, 
and most importantly the economic inequalities in the society are considered fair’.  
If, however, there are economic inequalities and discrimination against certain 
groups of the society based on race, root, or religion, then the dominant social group will 
ensure to have power over key political offices and positions at all levels of the state. 
This would give them control over the country’s resources, the army, the police, and 
judiciary, which will result in a continued discrimination and oppression. These actions 
will increase the risk of a conflict and the longer such discrimination and oppression 






2.2 Involvement and Policies of the International Community 
A very simple question that might be asked is why the international community 
should get involved in the reconstruction and recovery of failed states. There are two sets 
of notions in this regard. First, such actions represent ‘rational and ethical attempts to 
support “universal goods” such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and 
thereby create conditions under which those who have endured conflict and disruption 
can pursue the “good life”’(Gheciu & Welsh, 2009). The second view may not be clear 
when looked at from a local perspective but becomes apparent when analyzed on a global 
scale. There is a ‘growing recognition that weak or failed states may provide ideal 
conditions to nurture terrorist networks’ (Barakat, 2009). If the failed states are left 
untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach 
along with international organized crime and drug traffickers who exploit the 
dysfunctional environment. As such, failed states pose a threat to the political and 
economic stability of the entire region and national interests of many developed countries 
(Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). Thus, to control the threats posed by these states, the use of 
military force by the international community results in damaging and destabilizing 
effects on local people and institutions. The moral intuition is therefore to compensate for 
unintended consequences and ensure the well-being of those affected by such actions 
(Gheciu & Welsh, 2009). 
Rebuilding failed states has become a priority to the international community. As 
much as the international community would like to avoid involvement with the failed 
states, it is a reality that has to be faced. Terrorist groups have already exploited the 




of Africa and are likely to seek further advantage. These failed or failing states have 
either no longer a functioning government (Somalia), or their central government no 
longer control major parts of their territory (Pakistan), or those whose central 
governments can no longer provide the basic needs to their population (some African 
countries) (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). 
Significant international interventions to rebuild weak or failed states is certainly 
not always the answer because of the magnitude of efforts and resources involved, 
however international involvement does become inevitable in many cases. When dealing 
with a failed or failing state, the international community has at least eight policies to 
consider. These are: 
1. Do nothing in the hope that the situation will resolve itself without major 
action on the part of outsiders. 
2. Quarantine a failed state and monitor and intercept potential threats that 
emanate from the territory. 
3. Acknowledge that a failed state is no longer viable and to “carve it up” or 
recognize its dissolution into smaller pieces. 
4. Seek to integrate or absorb a failed state, or parts of it, into a larger entity, 
whether this entity is a single state or a body. 
5. Establish some sort of international transitional authority.  
6. Promote some sort of a neighborhood watch system, with countries in the 
region playing a central role in trying to solve or contain the problem. 
7. Back one side in a given conflict and hope that it emerges as the winner and 




8. Have a strategy and capacity for post-conflict reconstruction if regional 
stability is to be maintained, economic development advanced, lives saved, 
and transnational threats faced (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002).  
 
2.3 Immediate Post-conflict Reconstruction Objectives 
Contemporary post-war reconstruction programs have four defining features. 
First, they are not only designed to reconstruct but also improve significantly the 
performance of state institutions. These state institutions – promoting the rule of law, 
liberal democracy, supporting civil society and open economy – reflect a vision of social 
progress in a broader concept of development and modernization. Second, these 
programs are increasingly standardized and endorsed by international institutions, such as 
the World Bank, OECD and UN Development Program (UNDP). Third, the basic model 
of reconstruction and modernization is derived from ‘Western experiences of liberal 
political development and economic growth’, with ‘good governance’ as a recent addition 
to this model. Fourth, inclusion of ‘cooperative national elites’ to make the model work 
(Suhrke, 2007). 
This reconstruction program, as simple as it may seem, when executed in a post-
conflict setting, results in too many and frequently contradictory political and economic 
agendas due to the involvement of many international actors. As a result, a set of 
expectations and objectives are imposed marginalizing the recipient state institutions and, 





Barakat (2002) argues that two schools of thought exist concerning the timing of 
reconstruction and development activities. The first is that ‘peace is a prerequisite for 
reconstruction and development’. The second is that long term recovery will be feasible if 
the reconstruction and development activities are initiated at an appropriate time during 
the conflict. Evidence from world-wide experience supports the second theory. 
Though the situation after a war could be clearly outlined however not the 
situation after a conflict as various active variables continue to blur the situation. For this 
reason, Barakat and Zyck (2009) have termed ‘post-conflict recovery’ as ‘mid-conflict 
stabilization’. They contend that this approach not only affects the timing of intervention 
but also the sectors. The early implementation of post-conflict recovery activities has 
resulted in the politicization of, for instance, humanitarian assistance – including relief 
and reconstruction spending. While the objective of post-conflict recovery is to maintain 
peace and stability, focusing initial assistance towards the most violent areas has 
produced ‘perverse incentives not only for the continuation of violence in those areas but 
also for peaceful regions to permit, attract or mimic insurgent activity in hopes of 
maximizing access to resources’. This has resulted in the generation of extended 
insurgencies compared to the smaller scale violence at the end of the 1990s. 
Some researchers within the field of social sciences have started studying man-
made disasters with similar approaches as those used for the post-natural disaster 
recovery and reconstruction. However, due to the intricate nature of conflicts the two 
situations require completely different strategies. “Disaster relief requires both immediate 
emergency action and carefully planned reconstruction. The task following conflicts is 




alternatives to those structures, as prior systems and living patterns have been severely 
changed. In a post-conflict state, there are no identifiable communities to rebuild, the 
political authorities that were previously in place are no longer recognized or exist, the 
legal systems are nonexistent and there is often a negative attitude on the part of 
government toward aid donors”  (Hasic, 2004). However, this may not be the case in 
every post-conflict state. As long as the state and its inhabitants exist no matter in what 
condition, there will always be a community to rebuild; political authorities will get 
support from at least some members of the community; and some of the people 
constituting the government will have a positive attitude toward aid donors. In addition, 
in some cases following a conflict, the international community and aid donors would 
endeavor to return the state to status quo ante and step back when the state institutions 
become operational. 
Conflicts are the results of the failure of governance. In a post-conflict setting, 
good governance and public administration programs must be the cornerstone of peace 
building efforts (Panic, 2005). The international community should focus from the onset 
on the institutional changes and policies that promote and contribute to political and 
economic stability and development. Hamre & Sullivan (2002) have discussed four 
important pillars, distinct yet interrelated, necessary for post-conflict reconstruction. 
These are: 
I. Security 
“Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and 
secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions” (Hamre 




civilians as well as the territorial integrity of the post-conflict state. Security is significant 
in preventing conflicts between the dyads, warring factions, and pockets of groups trying 
to create insecurity in parts of the state. Good security can pave the road to economic 
development in terms of attracting national and international investments. Security is a 
prerequisite to the successful achievement of goals in a post-conflict state. 
II. Justice and Reconciliation 
“Justice and reconciliation addresses the need to deal with past abuses through 
formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict and to 
create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular, creating an 
effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws, and a humane 
corrections system” (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). In a post-conflict state failing to bring the 
wrongdoers to justice could provoke victims to retributive violence. Conflicts result in 
atrocities against civilians as well as combatants resulting in intense feelings of 
grievances, resentments, and animosities. If the problems that resulted in the conflict in 
the first place are not solved and if reconciliation of warring factions are not achieved 
then the future of the state will remain as bleak as its past (Panic, 2005). 
To secure a lasting peace, the government and the international community have 
to come to terms with the wrongdoers. If internal order is not established quickly, 
lawlessness will prevail with the state institutions, especially the judiciary and the police 
discredited. Therefore, the provision of internal order and security is highly prioritized as 
success of the post-conflict strategy depends on it (Panic, 2005). To deal with the 




community have six options at hand - trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, 
purges, and exiles (Binningsbo, Loyle, Gates, & Elster, 2012). 
 
III. Social and Economic Well-being 
“Social and economic well-being addresses fundamental social and economic 
needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the 
population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable 
economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program” (Hamre & 
Sullivan, 2002). Social and economic development is bound to take time in post-conflict 
states. The reconstruction of physical infrastructure and provision of social services are 
critical for the revival of the economic activity. However, none of the problems in a post-
conflict state can be solved in isolation. 
Sustained development could contribute to reducing the risk of conflict. To 
achieve major improvements in economic conditions, decisions have to be made early in 
the process. Two such important decisions are economic development and poverty 
reduction. To achieve these goals five economic policies are to be followed strictly 
(Panic, 2005).  
1. Achieve high levels of employment and job security in order to give everyone 
a stake in their country’s future. 
2. Sustain the rate of growth to maintain high levels of employment and job 
security in the long run. 
3. Keep prices stable so that the rate of inflation does not make it impossible to 




4. Ensure that gains from economic progress are distributed fairly and that no 
one should live below a socially acceptable standard. 
5. Sustain external balance to enable the country to preserve its economic 
sovereignty, thus allowing it to pursue the other four goals. 
However, the means and methods to achieve these economic objectives will have 
to remain flexible and pragmatic. 
IV. Governance and Participation 
“Governance and participation addresses the need to create legitimate, effective 
political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular, 
establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public-sector 
management and administration, and ensuring the active and open participation of civil 
society in the formulation of the country’s government and its policies” (Hamre & 
Sullivan, 2002). Good governance includes ‘sensible economic and social policies, 
democratic decision making, governmental transparency and financial accountability, 
creation of a marketfriendly environment for development, measures to combat 
corruption, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of press and 
expression’ (Barakat & Chard, 2002). 
As the United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has noted, “All these tasks – 
humantarian, military, political, social, and economic – are interconnected, and the 
people engaged in them need to work closely together. We cannot expect lasting success 
in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy. 
If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may turn out to have been 




2.4 The Development Challenge 
Reconstruction and development in a post-conflict setting is of utmost importance 
and are determinants of the prosperous or bleak future of the post-conflict state. But, does 
development in a post-conflict context have the same meaning as that in a developed 
country? Development may have different definitions for experts of different fields and 
the context it is used. In the first half of the twentieth century, the scholarly literature 
assumed development was about using the state to lead the process of modernizing the 
society and raise its income. However, contemporary development is less concerned 
about the level of involvement of the state in the development process. The consensus is 
for the state to be “better” involved in this process, and thus of significance is the 
administrative and technical capacity of the public sector (Rapley, 2007). It could, 
therefore, be contended that what development means is dependent on what it is supposed 
to achieve. However, in all cases, the objective of development is the provision of more 
resources and facilities to the society. It is to improve the quality of life of the people by 
providing access to education & health care, employment opportunities, better living 
environment and so forth. To Paul Collier (2007), “development is about giving hope to 
ordinary people that their children will live in a society that has caught up with the rest of 
the world.” 
How can a country, especially one that has come out of a conflict in the recent 
past, achieve these development objectives? There are two main types of resources that 
determine the level of development in a region a) hard resources (physical resources such 
as housing, infrastructures, public services, etc.), and b) soft resources (non-physical 




reconstruction and development in a post-conflict state is to provide people access to both 
the hard and soft resources that were lost and those resources that probably did not exist 
before the conflict (Lizarralde, Johnson, & Davidson, 2010). However, provision of these 
resources faces certain challenges. As mentioned earlier, the main development 
challenges in a post-conflict setting can be categorized into four groups – security, 
political, economic, and social. The effective tackling of these issues ensure one thing – 
the growth of the state; and growth leads to development. According to Collier (2007), 
73% of the people in low-income societies have been or are still in a conflict. One of the 
main reasons for this is the growth rate of these countries. He states that in “absolute 
terms the growth rate of these countries have been negative and in relative terms it has 
been much below than the rest of the developing countries”. Experts set development 
goals in these countries but they do not identify the process that could achieve these goals 
effectively and completely.  
The challenges in terms of growth that these countries face is what Collier (2007) 
calls the ‘development traps’. These traps are: 
1. The Conflict Trap 
Conflict is inherent to politics and it is one of the factors to slow and/or block 
growth. There are three economic characteristics that make a state more vulnerable to 
conflicts – low income, slow growth, and dependence on primary commodity exports. 
The lower the income of a country, the more it is likely to fall into a conflict. Slow 
growth will also increase this risk of conflict. A typical low-income country has a 14% 
risk of falling into a conflict in any five-year period. Any increase in the growth 




decrease in the growth percentage will increase the risk of conflict by the same 
percentage point. Dependence on the primary commodity exports, such as oil, diamonds, 
etc., significantly increases the risk of a conflict. These commodities have been found to 
not just finance conflicts but in times even motivate it. One example is the ‘conflict 
diamonds’, which is also known to some as the ‘blood diamonds’ of Africa. Low-income 
countries that have experienced a conflict have disproportionately high risks of relapse. 
2. The Natural Resource Trap 
The existence of natural resources in a state is a paradoxical trap that is generally 
thought of as a catalyst to prosperity, which in some cases is i.e. if a state has enough 
natural resources to forget about normal economic activities, for example, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. However, the surplus from natural resource exports has been found to 
significantly reduce growth. The export of resources in these states causes the currency to 
rise in value against other currencies, leaving other export activities of the state 
uncompetitive. This results in a loss of opportunities to diversify the economy which 
might have been the vehicle to technological progress. Resource rich countries receiving 
resource endowments have proved difficult to harness this income into growth, for 
example, much of the Middle East. The income from resources can take them to middle-
income countries status but to fully develop, they would need to use this wealth for 
growth. 
3. Landlocked with Bad Neighbors 
Economists have realized over the past decade that geography of a country 
matters when it comes to growth. Landlocked countries are hostages to their neighbors. 




this cost is directly related to the amount its coastal neighbor has spent on the transport 
infrastructure. A landlocked country loses around half a percentage point in the growth 
rate. However, for landlocked countries their neighbors not only serve as corridors to the 
overseas markets but also directly as markets. The economic conditions of the neighbors 
directly affect the economy of the landlocked country. For example, compare Switzerland 
where it is surrounded by Germany, Italy, France and Austria to Uganda where it is 
surrounded by Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, and Tanzania. The growth of 
neighbors benefit the growth of the landlocked countries in what is called the ‘growth 
spill over’. If the neighboring countries grow by an extra one percent, the landlocked 
country will grow by an extra 0.7 percent. Further, a resource-rich landlocked country 
can do much better compared to resource-scarce landlocked country, as the natural 
resources being valuable could be exported despite higher transport costs associated with 
being landlocked – for example, Botswana, abundant in diamonds. 
4. Bad Governance 
Good governance and economic policies can help increase the growth rate. But no 
matter what governments do, the economy cannot grow faster than 10%, which is the 
ceiling growth rate. Good governance and policy can help a country grow, but only if the 
growth opportunities exist. On the contrary, bad governance and policies can destroy the 
economy very rapidly. It is not easy to determine whether current governance and 
policies are adequate, but what societies could do is learn from failures – for instance, 
China completely changed its policies after the 1960s economic crisis generating the 
biggest economic success in history. However, not every leader would prefer such a 




people of the world, so it is in their benefit to keep their people uneducated and ill-
informed, while practicing the politics of patronage and corruption. Reformers, who 
rarely dare to make changes, are often suppressed and sometimes have to pay high price 
for their efforts. 
To sustain growth in order to support the development process, Collier et al. 
(2003) suggest the following strategies: 
1. Reduce Dependence on Primary Commodities 
Dependence on the primary commodities can increase the risk of rebellion, poor 
governance, and poor economic performance. Even though dependence on the primary 
commodities can be detrimental, yet they could be conducive to better growth of a 
country. The challenge is for the policy makers at the national and international level to 
devise policies that could help in better harnessing this potential. 
Diversification is one way of reducing dependence on the primary commodities 
which can significantly assist the growth and stability of the economy. Three factors have 
been found to reduce dependence on primary commodities – growth, aid, and policy. 
Growth assists in diversifying the economy in general resulting in a reduction of the risks 
of market price changes. Aid helps in reducing dependence on primary commodities as it 
provides an incentive to reduce exports and improves the infrastructure activities. Good 
economic policies can also significantly result in diversification. The effectiveness of 
policies is measured through the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) rates. An increase of one point in the CPIA of a developing country 





2. Reduce Corruption 
 Governments need to have transparency in using their revenues particularly that 
generated from natural resources, as embezzlement of this revenue by a group of elites 
could lead to the disappointment of the general public resulting in insecurity and/or 
rebellion. As the information provided by the government may not be considered reliable 
by the general public, a useful model here could be the formation of an alliance between 
the government, the civil society, and the World Bank to make the revenue and 
expenditure reports more trustworthy. 
3. Cushion Adverse Shocks 
Countries dependent on primary commodities may face severe negative shocks as 
the prices of these commodities are generally very unstable. These shocks will damage 
the medium-run growth of the country and the growth lost during this period may never 
be recovered. This could result in possible conflicts. For example, during the financial 
crisis of East Asia in 1998, the income of Indonesia fell by 10 percent which resulted in 
an escalation of violent conflict in Aceh. The international community, thus, in this 
regard will have to assist in cushioning these shocks as the governments of developing 
countries generally do not have the expertise, and sometimes the political goodwill, to 
“implement contractionary policies effectively”. For instance, OECD economies could 
adopt trade policies that could have a sharp effect on the world prices of primary 
commodities. 
4. Raise Economic Growth 
Faster economic growth will result in an increase in the income and promotion of 




policies, international aid, and access to global markets. It is not easy to establish what 
forms good policies; however it is clear what are bad policies. No economist desires 
“high and variable inflation, high trade barriers, widespread public ownership of 
marketed activities, or use of public employment for patronage rather than for equitable 
service delivery”. One way to determine the effectiveness of existing policies is using the 
World Bank’s CPIA, as mentioned earlier. This policy rating system rates 
“macroeconomic, structural, social, and public sector policies on a scale of 1 to 5”. The 
higher the rating of policies, the more effective they are. The average ratings of 
developing countries are 2.95 on this scale and those of successful developing countries 
are 3.75, for instance Ghana and India. An increase of one point in the CPIA is associated 
with an increase of 1.6 percent in the growth rate. 
Aid as a development assistance is found to increase the average growth rate of 
developing countries by 0.1 percentage point, if the amount of aid is increased by one 
percentage point as a share of GDP. Similarly, access to global markets will improve 
exports increasing the country’s foreign reserves resulting in a growth in the economy. 
However, major trade reforms are required to diversify as well as increase trade.  
 
2.5 Afghanistan: A Brief History 
The modern state of Afghanistan was founded by Ahmad Shah Abdali (later to be 
known as Ahmad Shah Durrani) in 1747.  An influential and powerful commander in the 
service of the Persian warlord Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah took control of his army and 
Nadir Shah’s chest of Mughal jewels after the Shah’s assassination. Subsequently, 





Figure  2.2. Map of Modern Afghanistan 
(Source: United Nations Cartographic Section) 
 
a series of lucrative raids into India. He created an empire that was built out of the 
collapse of three other Asian empires – the Uzbeks to the north, the Mughals to the south 
and the Safavids of Persia to the west. At its height, the empire extended from Nishapur 
in modern Iran through Afghanistan, the Punjab and Sindh to Kashmir and the threshold 
of Mughal Delhi. Following Ahmad Shah’s dead after contracting a tumor, his son, 
Timur Shah, succeeded him as the ‘Shah’ or king of the empire in 1772 (Dalrymple, 
2013). 
Subsequent to Timur Shah’s death in 1793, a volatile period followed as a result 
of power struggle between the Sadozai and Barakzai clans. In the meantime, the British 
East India Company was expanding rapidly out from its coastal factories to conquer 




British intervened militarily in 1838 to replace the pro-Russian Shah, Dost Mohammad, 
with the then exiled Shah Shuja, more amenable to the British interests. This foreign 
intervention stirred growing resentment among the Afghans leading to tribal oppositions 
and eventually to the first Anglo-Afghan war which resulted in complete demise of the 
British troops in 1842 (Holt, 2012). 
Driven by revenge and paranoia of the growing Russian influence in Afghanistan, 
the British commenced the Second Afghan War in 1878. Following a military triumph, 
reprisals came swiftly as the angry occupiers rounded up rebels and hung them ten at a 
time. The war caught fire again and burned brightly. At the battle of Maiwand, the British 
forces suffered a devastating defeat followed by a victory at the battle of Kandahar (Holt, 
2012). Following this victory the British forces withdrew soon after taking charge of 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs in exchange for protection against the Russians and Persians 
and an annual subsidy. A period of friendly Afghan-British relations began during the 
reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. However, after his death, his son, Amanullah Khan, 
who claimed the throne started the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 to claim control of 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs from the British. The Afghans ended up the victors in this 
war. 
The Afghans experienced a period of peace, tranquility, and prosperity in the 20th 
century. However, not long after, the former Prime Minister, Daoud Khan took charge of 
the affairs of the country by overthrowing the monarchy of his cousin Zahir Shah and 
declaring himself as the first President in 1973. Daoud’s modernization programs and 
reforms, set in the 1960s, accelerated after the 1973 coup creating both fears and 




ideas of what constituted ‘progress’. Developmental change had weakened traditional 
society and created new politically conscious social groups that the inflexible and later 
authoritarian political system under Daoud could not accommodate. Failure to 
accommodate the emerging communist and pro-Islamic movements in the political 
system and the growing political polarization eventually caused the political order to 
collapse. In the escalating tension between the communists and pro-Islamic supporters, 
the former developed a significant following in the armed forces and captured the state in 
a military supported coup in 1978 (Suhrke, 2007). 
The communists with their revolutionary ambitions and the violence which the 
regime unleashed saw rapidly growing resistance among the common Afghans (Suhrke, 
2007). The following year, in response to increasing fears of Islamic resistance both 
within Afghanistan and the newly declared Islamic Republic of Iran, the USSR invaded 
the country in support of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
government.  
From late 1979 until February 1989 Soviet military forces occupied Afghanistan, 
during a period marked by fierce resistance from Afghan fighters, known as the 
Mujahidin, backed mainly by the USA and the Pakistani intelligence agency. After nearly 
a decade of occupation, the Geneva accords of 1988 led to the withdrawal of all Soviet 
forces in early 1989. Despite being considered as a success, the accords had failed to 
address adequately the issue of the post-occupation period and the future of governance 
of Afghanistan (Barakat, 2002).  
In 1992 the Mujahidin groups formed an alliance but with no united or coherent 




to power sharing between the different Mujahidin factions led to the collapse of their 
coalition as a new phase in the conflict began. What began as a struggle against 
occupying Soviet forces mutated into an internal power struggle as the different factions 
within the Mujahidin regime fought each other. This civil war left a political vacuum 
which resulted in the emergence of the Taliban towards the end of 1994. Within two 
years of their emergence, the Taliban had captured the major cities of Kandahar, Herat, 
and Kabul as the Mujahedin forces either fled or joined them. By mid-2001 the Taliban 
controlled more than 90% of Afghanistan and the overall situation in the areas they 
controlled was one of relative peace, in the sense that factional fighting had ceased 
(Barakat, 2002). 
It was during the Taliban rule that the Al-Qaeda set its base in Afghanistan. Large 
numbers of foreign nationals, from Pakistan, Chechnya and many Arab countries, had 
come to Afghanistan to undertake military training in camps run by Al-Qaeda (many of 
these camps had originally been established with the assistance of western countries to 
provide support to the Mujahedin). The attacks of 11 September 2001 in America, 
attributed to the Al-Qaeda, led to the military campaign aimed at the overthrow of the 
Taliban regime in October 2001. Within a month of this military campaign, the Taliban 
forces retreated from Kabul in November 2001 (Barakat, 2002) marking the beginning of 
a new phase in the history of modern Afghanistan. 
 
2.6 Afghanistan: Post 2001 
Shortly after the apparent defeat of the Taliban, talks were held about the future of 




establishment of an interim authority, which included a number of warlords, with Hamid 
Karzai as the Chair. In addition, an Independent Commission was also established 
charged with organizing an ‘Emergency Loya Jirga’ (a Pashto term, meaning a ‘Grand 
Assembly of Elders’) six months after the Bonn conference. This Jirga was responsible 
for the establishment of a multi-ethnic Transitional Administration to overlook the affairs 
of the state until the official elections of 2004. Furthermore, a Constitutional Loya Jirga 
was also established which adopted a new constitution for the country on 4 January 2004 
(Barakat, 2002). 
 
2.6.1 An Overview of the Reconstruction Program 
The reconstruction program in Afghanistan initiated by the international 
community was highly ambitious. ‘In its minimalist version, the aim was to eliminate 
terrorist safe havens, reconstruct the state, and kick-start the economy; in its maximalist 
form the plan was also to develop and modernize Afghan society’. In defining the tasks 
this way and setting timetables and benchmarks for monitoring progress, the international 
community was boldly challenging the formidable difficulties ahead (Suhrke, 2007). As 
Barakat (2002), a well-known researcher in the field of post-war recovery and having 
served as an advisor and consultant in this regard to many organizations & countries 
including the UN, the World Bank, Afghanistan and so forth, rightly notes it, “the biggest 
problem facing those charged with the task of Afghan reconstruction is that rebuilding 
has been embarked upon not on the basis of the real and acute need to rebuild, nor as part 
of a carefully planned, integrated process… on the contrary, it has been initiated as part 




actors on the contrary may contend that the task of rebuilding Afghanistan has been 
embarked as part of a planned process. The activities corresponding to this process, for 
instance those of USAID’s, are to ‘rehabilitate the rural economy; develop financial 
organizations; increase trade and export; repair the infrastructure for energy, transport, 
and water services; assist in building democratic institutions; and develop the capacity of 
those institutions to perform in a participatory, accountable and responsible manner’ 
(USAID, 2013). Thus, one could say that proper planning has been taken place in the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan; however whether those plans have 
translated in the field into what was desired is a different question. 
 
2.6.2 Diversity of Actors 
There seems to be a lack of coordination and planning among the external actors 
themselves and with the government of Afghanistan which could be associated to the 
interests of the various actors involved in this process. Suhrke et al (2002) states that, 
“the diversity of interests among Afghan parties, and the large number of international 
actors involved, suggest that the most difficult part of the peace-building effort lies 
ahead”. In general, there are more than 60 countries and 20 international organizations 
who have participated in the recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan (Oskarsson, 
2012). Of these, the US, Japan, the UK, the European Commission (EC), the World Bank 
(WB), Germany, and Canada are the major donors (Waldman, 2008).  
The presence of all these international actors in Afghanistan, each following their 
personal agendas and vested political, economic, social, and other interests, has resulted 




provision of developmental assistance and the allocation of reconstruction initiatives, 
Afghanistan has had only an observer’s status. The priorities expressed by the Afghans 
have been outshined by those of the external actors. The Afghan government has only 
had control of more than a fraction of its own core operating budget (Barakat & Zyck, 
2010). Of the estimated $57 billion spent on the reconstruction of Afghanistan in the 
period 2002-2010, only $6 billion has been channeled through the national development 
budget with the full ownership of the Government (Afghan Government, 2011). 
However, from the perspective of the international community, channeling a smaller 
amount of funds through the government’s development budget could mean a lack of 
capacity of the Afghan government and the existence of corruption. With the warlords 
given share in the government and the politics of patronage a common practice, the 
international community might have considered channeling more funds through the 
government’s budget an ineffective way of utilizing resources for the reconstruction and 
development of Afghanistan. This might have resulted in more development funds 
siphoned off by the warlords. 
 
2.6.3 Managing the Reconstruction Program 
In 2002 when the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was formed, the need for 
greater governmental control over the reconstruction process was recognized. This 
resulted in the establishment of the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). 
However, according to the World Bank observations, ‘this unit itself required capacity 
building in order to play its intended role. This left the international actors to exercise 




dissolved in 2003 and the functions of aid coordination and management were 
incorporated into the ‘General Budget Directorate’ of Ministry of Finance (Ministry of 
Finance, 2010). ‘While the international community continues to argue that the lack of 
capacity justifies the circumvention of the government structures, it is important to note 
that they have entrenched this lack by failing to provide adequate opportunities for 
capacity development’ (Barakat et al., 2008).  
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is a major funding channel 
to support the rehabilitation and development efforts of the Afghan Government. It was 
designed to act as a treasury for the government. ‘However, the ARTF has remained 
entirely under the control of its donors and has received almost no funds from some of its 
largest donors – the US and Japan. As a result of bypassing the ARTF, and the preference 
for direct execution by donors through implementing partners, the Afghan government 
has only had control on approximately one percent of all project-based international 
assistance. While it is not necessary for the Afghan State to utilize all international 
revenues itself, it should be more greatly involved in their allocation. Indeed, a more 
collaborative governance would have been appropriate. This would have allowed the 
international community and the Afghan government to divide and share responsibilities. 
The result of not pursuing collaborative governance and the exclusion of the Afghan 
government from this process has left the government disempowered having not 
developed the necessary capabilities to take a leading role in the country’s recovery and 






2.6.4 Funding Commitments and Management 
‘Even more damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of the 
Taliban was the low level of committed funding to rebuild a country laid waste by almost 
three decades of war’ (T. H. Johnson & Mason, 2007). ‘On the humanitarian front, per 
capita reconstruction  assistance for Afghanistan is a third what was provided in Iraq and 
one-twelfth given to Bosnia and Herzegovina more than a decade ago despite the 
appalling lack of infrastructure, human resources, state institutions, and basic services in 
Afghanistan’ (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). Furthermore, ‘international studies of peace-
building and reconstruction packages highlight the gap between the rhetoric and pledges 
of the international community and the reality in terms of delivery on the ground’ 
(Goodhand, 2002), which has been replicated in Afghanistan. 
In the seven conferences held on the development and reconstruction of 
Afghanistan in the period 2002 to 2012, a total of $63.44 billion was pledged by the 
international community and donors. An additional $56 billion was pledged outside these 
conferences. This is indicated in Table 2.3. However, as seen in Table 2.4, only $85.116 
billion was committed off these pledges till the end of 2011, out of which only $69.723 
billion was disbursed. Figure 2.4 shows the trend and amounts of the external assistance 
committed and disbursed annually for the period 2002-2011. 
 
Table  2.3. Total Pledges as of July 2012 ($billions) 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012) 








Tokyo Berlin London Rome Paris Chicago Tokyo 
2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2012 2012 




Table  2.4. Total Commitment as of December 2011 ($millions) 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012) 
Rank Donor 2002-2011 Commitment 2002-2011 Disbursement 
1 United States of America 57,383 47,524 
2 Japan 3,821 3,821 
3 European Union/European Commission 3,077 2,816 
4 United Kingdom 2,574 2,578 
5 Germany 2,435 978 
6 Asian Development Bank 2,400 1,129 
7 World Bank 2,378 1,852 
8 India 1,588 759 
9 Canada 1,371 1,371 
10 Netherlands 1,109 1,110 
11 Australia 953 806 
12 Norway 852 712 
13 Sweden 736 736 
14 Italy 697 589 
15 Denmark 503 503 
16 United Nations 446 182 
17 Iran 399 367 
18 France 376 199 
19 Turkey 226 193 
20 Spain 220 194 
21 Others (25 donors) 1,572 1,304 
 Total 85,116 69,723 
 
 
Figure  2.3. Annual Commitments & Disbursements (2002-2011) 








































There are multiple reasons for the difference between aid commitments and 
disbursements. One of the reasons is the challenging operating conditions, nominally, 
insecurity. ‘Security deterioration is considered to be a major obstacle hindering project 
implementation across the country’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). However, the fact that 
this much aid circumvents the government could be partly linked to ‘budget execution 
problems, such as capacity constraints, procurement delays and complex budget 
procedures’. Although, the government has been able to disburse over $4 billion of funds 
in 2011, still the over $8 billion that has bypassed it points to the enduring lack of 
capacity of the government. The donors are partly responsible for this lack of capacity as 
‘sufficient funds have not been devoted to build the institutional and implementing 
capacities of line ministries’. Further, another reason is corruption, which ‘remains 
endemic and is compounded by limited financial oversight and weak governance’. A 
major concern in this regard is ‘the lack of political will to tackle high level corruption’. 
Yet, improvements have been observed in the government’s ‘public financial 
management systems, fiduciary controls and regulatory framework’ (Waldman, 2008). 
While the government is primarily responsible for abusing badly-needed assistance, the 
international community must also share the blame. “Poorly conceived state-building 
projects, the failure to enforce oversight, to properly measure outcomes rather than just 
inputs and to address systemic failures in aid delivery create opportunities for corruption” 
(Crisis Group, 2011) . 
More than half of the total international assistance or Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) has been invested in the security sector i.e. provision of equipment, 




has been invested in sectors, such as Governance, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Education, Health, Private Sector Development, Social Protection, and 
others (Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
The dispersion of the ODA, for the development of both security and non-security 
sectors, takes place via two main channels of delivery:  
a) Off-budget: This “support consists of assistance that bypasses the 
government’s Public Finances Management System with little or no 
government involvement in planning, implementation or monitoring of the 
programs/projects” (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
b) On-budget: This “support consists of assistance that either has been given to 
the government as bilateral support or provided through the Trust Funds. Most 
such on-budget programs are government designed, implemented, and 
monitored” (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
According to the government’s reports, less than 20% of the ODA has been 
provided through the government’s Core Budget, whereas more than 80% has been 
‘managed by the Development Partners (DP) through projects/programs implemented 
parallel to those of the government’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Table 2.5 below shows 
the total ODA provided through government budget for the period 2003 – 2011. 
 
Table  2.5. ODA Through Government Budget, 2003-2011 ($millions) 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 2012) 
FY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Budget 1,620 864 1,344 1,646 2,250 2,818 2,731 3,266 4,331 
Donor’s Contribution 1,238 559 918 1,109 1,534 1,900 1,662 1,800 2,169 




2.6.5 The Dispute 
Implementation of parallel programs/projects by DPs and their implementing 
partners have always been criticized by the government. Such donor-driven practices, 
with no accountability to the government, do not align with programs of national priority. 
The contracting and sub-contracting processes of the DPs have a negative impact on the 
Afghan economy. Further, they are not conducive to building the capacity of the state 
institutions (Ministry of Finance, 2010).  One such structure parallel to the government is 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) whose effectiveness and contribution to peace 
and stability in Afghanistan has been frequently questioned by many researchers (Barakat 
& Zyck, 2009; Waldman, 2008; Crisis Group, 2011; Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
PRTs are civil-military teams with the objective to ‘extend the authority of the 
central government and improve security, thereby facilitating the reconstruction process 
at the provincial level’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010).  PRTs are not development agencies 
but are engaged in development projects. These military reconstruction bodies work as 
part of a broader counter-insurgency operation aimed at winning local support for 
international military forces and newly established governments (Barakat & Zyck, 2009) 
through their Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). As 
such, ‘aid programs in these areas focus more on meeting narrow security objectives than 
achieving nationwide development goals or building and strengthening state institutions’ 
(Crisis Group, 2011). In doing so, PRTs have in many cases undermined the emergence 
of effective institutions of national and local government and other civil development 




Such practices demonstrate the lack of coordination and communication between 
the DPs and the government. Barakat and Zyck (2009) contend that due to the influx of 
actors with distinct and often contradictory agendas, coordination will remain chaotic 
which will significantly inhibit effective recovery. Further, each actor ‘brings agendas 
associated with its domestic constituency, with the ideologies of its rulers and with its 
desire for recognition and relevance’. Such varying agendas make it difficult for the DPs 
to coordinate among themselves and with the government in a way to maximize the 
efficiency and delivery of projects. According to the government, a large number of DPs 
follow their own ‘aid strategies, design methods, procurement policies, and 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures’. Consequently, aid is fragmented 
with projects duplicated in the absence of well-shared information among the DPs 
resulting in unbalanced and inequitable development (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
‘donors often channel funds directly to implementing partners or contractors, and do not 
always keep the relevant Afghan ministries informed about financial flows’. This has 
resulted in the government not having information on how some $5 billion were spent 
since 2001(Waldman, 2008). 
 
2.6.6 The Aid Effect 
Aid has a major impact on peace and stability. The way aid is delivered can have 
a varying level of effect on development and poverty reduction. Poverty is a significant 




in Afghanistan (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Thus, how effectively the aid is used could 
steer Afghanistan towards peace and stability or insecurity and devastation. 
“While aid has undoubtedly contributed to progress in Afghanistan, a large 
proportion of aid has been prescriptive and supply-driven rather than indigenous and 
responding to Afghan needs. It has been heavily influenced by the political and military 
objectives of donors, especially the imperative to win so called ‘hearts and minds’. It has 
tended to reflect expectations in donor countries rather than what Afghan communities 
want and need. Projects have too often sought to impose a preconceived idea of progress 
rather than nurture, support and expand capabilities, according to Afghan preferences” 
(Waldman, 2008). 
Development is not a short term effort, yet much of the development aid in 
Afghanistan has been appropriated to Quick Impact Projects in regions where donor-
country troops are deployed. It is unsurprising that such projects have yet to produce 
sustainable results. “While there is no doubt that aid is required to address short-term, 
especially humanitarian, challenges, to some extent this has come at the expense of 
Afghan participation, sustainable poverty reduction, and capacity building objectives. 
There has been a tendency to overlook intangible dimensions of aid, especially the 
promotion of Afghan ownership, which is essential for achieving project relevance, 
utility, and sustainability” (Waldman, 2008). 
In this manner, much of the aid has been ineffective or wasted. Based on a 
number of assessments, it has been found that ‘the impact of aid on lives remain 
uncertain, particularly when assistance is shaped by stabilization goals rather than the 




report, Evaluating U.S Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (2011), the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee stated, “The evidence that stabilization programs promote stability 
in Afghanistan is limited. Some research suggests the opposite and development best 
practices question the efficacy of using aid as a stabilization tool over the long run”. The 
US government’s development agency (USAID), for instance, concentrates more than 
half of its budget on the four most insecure provinces to achieve counter-insurgency 
objectives. This approach is not only inequitable but dangerously short-sighted. Such aid 
distribution disparities could be perceived as insecurity attracting more aid. Thus such 
perverse incentives could attract insurgency in relative secure areas with persistent 
poverty (Waldman, 2008). 
Moreover, the donors spend a significant proportion of assistance on 
administrative costs, purchasing goods and services, as well as highly paid advisers from 
their own countries (Crisis Group, 2011). As cited in Waldman (2008) and Development 
Cooperation Report (2010), according to NATO Special Civilian Representative, the 
World Bank, and Oxfam about 40% of aid to Afghanistan flows back to the donor 
countries as a result of these donor placed conditionalities. ‘Such operations not only 
result in the loss of opportunities to generate income for the Afghan service providers and 
local producers, but also make the results less cost-beneficial as the cost of both services 
and goods are lower in Afghanistan than donor countries’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
‘Drawing somewhat on external resources is unavoidable but a large number of projects 
do so to an extent which cannot be justified. As a result, international construction 
contracts in Afghanistan are estimated to have just 10-15% local economic impact’ 




by donors in the London Conference where increased use of Afghan services and goods 
are encouraged. 
 
2.6.7 Building the Afghan Capacity 
Afghanistan lost many of its skilled human resources during the three decades of 
fighting and disturbances and opportunities to replenish this created gap were missing. 
The educational and training institutes to prepare the Afghans to carry the responsibility 
of managing the reconstruction and development of their country were either completely 
destroyed or were of low standards of negligible impact. The significant change in the 
government system in the past ten years with the support of the international community 
provided conditions for the Afghans to continue higher education and get sufficient 
knowledge and skills to build their country. But still there is an obvious shortage of 
qualified experts who can make a difference. 
A quarter of international aid is used to fund international consultants with the 
objective to support government capacity building. While there is a need for the 
government to receive technical and managerial support, however it has had a minimal 
impact. Based on the review of World Bank (2007), ‘technical assistance (TA) tends to 
be donor driven, and peppered around at high cost with little effective involvement from 
national decision makers and only marginal impact in terms of lasting capacity building’. 
Waldman (2008) notes that, ‘the total cost of each full-time expatriate consultant is in the 
range of $250,000 to $500,000 a year’. At the Interior Ministry of Afghanistan, 282 
foreign advisers are absorbing a total of $36 million a year (Crisis Group, 2011). In the 




uncoordinated and non-strategically targeted technical assistance is neither fiscally nor 
politically sustainable’. It is estimated that a total of $1.6 billion was used to fund 
international TAs between the period 2002 to 2006 (World Bank, 2007). The Afghan 
government on the other hand criticizes the use of these international TAs as substitutes 
for civil servants being engaged in daily operations rather than on institution building. 
These TAs have not been able to transfer the required knowledge and skills to Afghan 
institutions thus leaving a similar vacuum after their departure which existed before their 
deployment (Ministry of Finance, 2010).   
A possible working model here could be the establishment of an Afghan Capacity 
Development Agency. This agency should have representatives from both the Afghan 
government and the international community. The agency should initially determine the 
exact needs of the Afghan government at all levels and devise a capacity building 
program that could train and educate the Afghan officials as required. However, this 
agency should periodically evaluate the impact of this program and the changing needs of 
the Afghan government and modify its modules and programs accordingly. 
 
2.6.8 Contracting and Construction 
The international community and donors committed a total of $9.24 billion to the 
infrastructure sector of Afghanistan during the period 2002 – 2011; however out of this 
commitment only $6.02 billion was disbursed (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Many of the 
projects funded by this development aid are awarded to national and international 
contractors. However, the contracting and subcontracting processes of these projects have 




sustainable. Though, the contracting and subcontracting of projects is a common norm 
throughout the world, however in Afghanistan some large projects have up to five layers 
of national and international subcontractors. Each layer of these contractors retain 10-
20%, and in some cases up to 50%, profit on any given contract (Ministry of Finance, 
2010). This practice not only increases the total operational cost but also results in fewer 
dollars spent on the project, compromising the quality and hence achievement of the 
desired objectives.  
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assists Afghanistan 
through the issuance of contracts, assistance instruments, and direct assistance to the 
Afghan government (Hutton & Johnson, 2012). It uses contractors, also called 
implementing partners, to help award and administer its contracts and grants and perform 
on-site monitoring of other contractors’ activities (C. M. Johnson, 2010). USAID relies 
heavily on six US contractors – inter alia, KBR, the Louis Berger Group, Chemonics 
International, Bearing Point and Dyncorp International – and allocates a major portion of 
its funds to them (Waldman, 2008). These contractors, absorbing aid in corporate profits, 
in turn subcontract to local companies, hence increasing the overall project cost and 
making it difficult to know if funds are spent as intended. For example, the construction 
of a short stretch of road leading to Kabul international airport was awarded to the Louis 
Berger Group by USAID in 2005 who in turn subcontracted to another construction 
company. The cost of this project is reported to be $2.4 million per kilometer, at least 
four times the average cost of road construction in Afghanistan, which could range 
between $100,000 and $600,000 based on the terrain and region (Waldman, 2008). 




addressed related risks – for instance conflicts of interest. Federal regulations require 
enhanced oversight of contractors in situations where they provide close support to 
governmental functions, however USAID has been generally unable do so (C. M. 
Johnson, 2010).  
USAID lacks a sufficient number of supervising personnel with work experience 
in contingent regions such as Afghanistan. One of the reasons is the high turn-over rate of 
USAID personnel (C. M. Johnson, 2010). This has led to poor implementation of projects 
by many contractors and subcontractors, resulting in a waste of development aid. For 
instance, “the Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO), another 
US consultancy and services firm has implemented construction projects under a four-
year $60 million USAID alternative livelihood program in Badakhshan, most of which 
are reportedly unfinished or breaking down. During their implementation between 2005 
and 2009, it was reported that only one USAID staffer monitored performance on the 
ground, with USAID relying on third party monitors” (Crisis Group, 2011). USAID has 
acknowledged that it has limited ability to verify the accuracy and completeness of the 
reports provided by contractors (Hutton & Johnson, 2012). The specific reason provided 
by the USAID for this lack of monitoring and evaluation of projects and verification of 
reports is the security environment of Afghanistan. The high-threat security environment 
requires USAID personnel to travel with armored vehicles and armed escorts to visit 
projects in much of Afghanistan. This has limited their movement and the frequency of 







USAID programs are more prone to corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse because 
of its improper execution of performance management and evaluation procedures (Hutton 
& Johnson, 2012). The same could be contended about many other actors involved in the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. There is no or only minimal 
accountability for donors and their implementing partners. Donors are subject to little or 
no scrutiny, as opposed to the Afghan government who is liable for 77 measurable 
benchmarks based on the Afghan Compact (Waldman, 2008). Quick and visible projects 
with no proper planning and coordination with all the relevant stakeholders might win the 
hearts and minds of the people temporarily but sustainability and long term benefits of 
these projects are questionable. ‘Donors, in their haste, have invested much aid to short-
term military objectives and timeframes, but when the drawdown begins, funding and 
civilian personnel presence may rapidly decline, undermining the sustainability of 




Afghanistan has come a long way and made significant progress since 2001. 
Some of the noticeable accomplishments, as shown in table 2.6, are for instance, 
‘increase in the provision of access to primary health care from 8% of the population to 
more than 60%.; increase in the number of children getting education in schools from 900 
thousand to over 8 million; pavement of about 2000 kilometers of road cutting travel time 




services to over 80% of the population; carrying out of elections; increase in the per 
capita GDP from $180 to over $530; increase in an average fiscal growth rate of  9%; 
open media; growth in the role of women in the society with girls making 39% of the 
students in schools and women emerging as successful political, business, civil, and 
society leaders’ (The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011). 
Although, much has been achieved during the last decade with the assistance of 
the international community, however there remains much to be achieved yet. To set on a 
path of successful development, the Afghan government will have to spare no efforts to 
overcome the challenges present in this process. Afghanistan currently faces three 
development challenges – the conflict trap, landlocked with bad neighbors, and bad 
governance. As Afghanistan is a resource rich country, it would not be far from the 
present that it might also get trapped by the fourth development challenge – the natural 
resource trap. Overcoming these challenges would be an uphill climb for the Afghan 
government, in particular to the policymakers. Whether Afghanistan will be able to 
successfully overcome these traps and join the group of successful developing countries 
or continue remaining trapped and stay among the underdeveloped countries depends 






Table  2.6. Afghanistan Development Indicators, 2002-2011 
(Source: World Bank) 
Information Detail 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Population, total (million) 22.2 23.1 24.0 24.8 25.6 26.3 27.0 27.7 28.3 29.1 
Population growth (annual %) 3.93 4.03 3.83 3.45 3.05 2.76 2.56 2.47 2.46 2.46 
Urban population (% of total) 21.1 21.3 21.6 21.8 22.1 22.4 22.7 22.9 23.2 23.5 
Population density (people per sq. km of land area) 34.0 35.4 36.8 38.1 39.3 40.4 41.4 42.4 43.5 44.6 
GDP (current US$)(billion) 4.1 4.5 5.2 6.2 7.0 9.8 10.1 12.4 15.9 18.0 
GDP growth (annual %)  8.4 1.0 11.1 5.5 13.7 3.6 21.0 8.4 6.9 GDP per capita (current US$) 185.9 198.2 220 252.4 275.3 373.5 376.9 450.6 561.2 619.5 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)  11.7 11.2 10.9 7.1 22.3 2.1 -2.1 9.4 10.6 GNI (current US$)(billion)   5.0 6.1 6.9 8.6 9.8 12.7 14.3 16.6 GNI per capita (current US$)   210 250 270 330 360 460 510 570 Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)     8.8 6.9 7.9 10.5 11.0 11.3 Net ODA received per capita (current US$) 58.9 68.9 96.2 114.1 115.5 188.4 180.3 225.0 226.3 230.5 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)(million) 50.0 57.8 186.9 271.0 238.0 188.6 87.2 213.6 75.6 83.4 
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$)(billion)     0.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 62.3 48.9 46.9 45.5 42.3 38.0 33.5 30.5 35.2 34.6 
Refugee population by country or territory of origin (million) 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.6 
Internally displaced persons (number, high estimate)(thousand) 920 600 200 200 132 161 235 297 352 456 
Battle-related deaths (number of people) 699 353 621 1271 3167 5901 4446 5103 6241 7234 
Armed forces personnel, total (thousand) 12 13 27 27 51 51 94 255.7 306.8 340.3 
Military expenditure (% of GDP)  2.0 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.0 3.6 4.7 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 45.8 46.0 46.3 46.6 46.9 47.2 47.5 47.9 48.2 48.6 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)  14.3   18.9  24   38.6 Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) 129.2 125.9 122.7 119.4 116.3 113.4 109.7 106.7 103.9 101.1 
Improved water source (% of population with access) 30 33 38 42 46 50 50 50 50  Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 33 34 34 35 35 37 37 37 37  School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  11.7 16.4 17.2 25.7 25.6 34.1 39.7 45.5 48.5 Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)  54.7 40.9 55.4 58.1 57.6 59.6 62.1 63.7 65.9 Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 0.1 0.7 2.2 4.3 8.8 16.0 26.4 34.3 41.3 54.2 





2.7 Chapter Summary 
Looking at the history of conflicts and the data at hand we could come to the 
conclusion that the current trend of conflicts will continue in the future. Conflicts will 
continue to cause casualties  and displace people within and outside their respective 
states. Though, there is no general agreement on the causes of conflicts, at the least 
academically, however there are characteristics that are found to be common among 
states that have experienced a conflict. Such characteristics are poverty, 
‘impoverishment, inequality & pessimism’, and ‘social divisions & politicial oppression’. 
When faced with a failing or failed state that could pose a threat to the regional stability 
or the national interests of developed countries, the international community has at least 
eight policies to choose from. What comes next to intervention by the international 
community in these conflicts is the phase of reconstruction and development of these 
states. This phase of reconstruction is to enable the state institutions and people to take 
charge of their affairs. The four major areas that need to be addressed immediately after 
the reconstruction phase begins are security, justice & reconcilliation, social & economic 
well-being, and governance & participation. 
In Afghanistan, after a decade of major security, development and humanitarian 
assistance, the international community and the Afghan government has failed to achieve 
a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Most Afghans still live in 
conditions of hardship and extreme poverty. The international aid has been prescriptive 
and used by the donors based on their priorities rather than Afghan needs and 
preferences. The construction and development projects have been delivered with results 




assistance and development of government capacity has been wasteful, donor driven and 
of limited impact. State institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good 
governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human 
security. ‘As the insurgency spreads to areas regarded as relatively safe till now, and 
policy makers in Washington and other Western capital seeks a way out of an unpopular 
war, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state 





CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
“The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible.” 
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created 
them.” 
Albert Einstein, Princeton (Lectures 1933-1945) 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The issue of sustainable reconstruction and development in Afghanistan is 
influenced by many factors. Some of these factors are the ‘participatory’ approach of the 
international community, the donor conditionalities, the insecurity, the lack of 
coordination and planning among the different actors and organizations, and the lack of 
technical capacity within the Afghan institutions. The general approach of the 
international community and the donors throughout this reconstruction and recovery 
phase has been a participatory rather than a ‘blue-print’ approach (Barakat & Zyck, 
2009). This approach has led to a slower and less effective process of progress, recovery 
and development. Models of western democracy, governance, and liberal economy 
adopted have not been very effective due to the presence of different variables and 
parameters, for instance cultural, security, and geopolitical, which do not fit within these 




 sufficiently developed and stable. Donor conditionalities have resulted in the 
organizations and people to focus more on the visible outcomes of the projects and 
programs than the long-term impact and the effectiveness of the process. During aid 
negotiations, conditionalities are asserted by donors and accepted by recipients with no or 
little objection because of their extreme vulnerability or lack of bargaining authority 
(Barakat & Chard, 2002). Security is of vital importance to the effective recovery and 
reconstruction of a war-torn state. There has to be an understanding between the 
international community and the state representatives incharge of this process to yield 
better outcomes. No objective can be achieved with a lack of planning and coordination 
among all the relevant stakeholders. However, with a lack of capacity within the state 
institutions, measures should be taken to develop their capacity and handover more 
responsibility to them. It would be desirable to know when the whole process of 
reconstruction and development is Afghan led after 2014, what current problems would 
continue to exist and what new challenges would emerge to impede the process of 
sustainable reconstruction and development. 
 
3.2 Research Bias 
Utmost care was taken by the author to remain unbiased in this research. However 
taking into account the nature and mentality of the humans, it may be possible that 
unintentionally and subconsciously some of the materials and findings in this research 
may have been biased. A reason for this could have been the author’s link to Afghanistan. 
Further, the participants interviewed for this study were all present in Afghanistan. These 




involved in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Thus, there is a 
possibility that the responses of these participants to the interview questions may have 
been biased to one end or the other. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
“The “holy grail” of research is establishing methodological rigor. This refers to a 
researcher's responsibility to ensure that procedures have been adhered to and 
confounding factors eliminated to produce dependable results” (Hasson & Keeney, 
2011). This study has been carried out using two approaches - the Delphi technique and 
the use of case studies. These methods were used to bring to light some of factors 
affecting the process of sustainable reconstruction and development in Afghanistan in the 
post 2014 period. 
 
3.3.1 The Delphi Technique 
The Delphi Technique is a qualitative method that “elicits, refines, and draws 
upon the collective opinion and expertise of a group of experts for long-range 
forecasting” (Gupta & Clarke, 1996).  More generally, the technique is seen as a 
procedure to “obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts…by a 
series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback” (Dalkey 
& Helmer, 1963).  It is typically used to “elicit information, suggestions, and judgments 
from a dispersed and heterogeneous group of specialists on an issue of interest to all of 
them, but where there may not yet be a clear agreement on the shape of the issue” 




statistical or model-based procedures, it is to judge and forecast situations in which pure 
model-based statistical methods are not practical or possible because of the lack of data – 
historical, economic, technical – and thus some form of human judgmental input is 
necessary (Rowe & Wright, 1999). As such, the goal of Delphi is ‘simply to obtain as 
many high-quality responses and opinions as possible on a given issue from a group of 
experts to enhance decision making’ (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). 
The Delphi Technique is named after the Greek oracle at Delphi, who offered 
visions of the future to those who sought advice (Gupta & Clarke, 1996).  This technique 
was developed in the 1950s by – Gordon, Helmer, and Dalkey – workers at the RAND 
corporation while working on a project funded by the US Air Force (Rowe & Wright, 
1999). The method became popular and aroused worldwide interest after an article 
describing this research was published in 1963 (Woudenberg, 1991). 
The Delphi Technique has many applications and “works well when the factors 
surrounding the problem are not well understood, controversial or subjectively weighted. 
It is particularly useful in generating a model for future data-gathering” (Lambert et al., 
2007). Some uses of this technique are to: 
1. Establish goals and their priorities. 
2. Identify the dimensions and attributes of a problem. 
3. Provide predictions. 
4. Clarify positions and delineate differences between group members. 
5. Gather information from a group whose members wish to retain their 




A key reason for the continuous popularity of Delphi is its unique strengths. It is a 
structured, yet indirect, approach to quickly and efficiently elicit responses from experts 
who bring knowledge, authority, and insight to the problem (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). 
Gupta & Clarke (1996) describes some of the advantages of this technique as below: 
1. This method captures a wide range of interrelated variables and 
multidimensional features common to most complex problems. 
2. It has a fair to good prediction accuracy over different time horizons. 
3. It documents facts and opinions of the experts. 
4. It avoids pitfalls of face-to-face interaction, such as group conflict and 
individual dominance. 
5. It is a good method to deal with the open-ended and creative aspects of a 
problem because it motivates independent thought and gradual formation of 
solutions. 
6. It is a relatively inexpensive method to organize and administer. 
However, this technique has also some limitations, which include “potential for 
sloppy execution, crudely designed questions, poor choice of experts, and limited value 
of feedback” (Gupta & Clarke, 1996). 
 
3.3.2 General Delphi Procedure 
The Delphi technique is iterative. It is executed in ‘rounds’. A set of initial 
questions framed around an issue is sent to a list of preselected experts via email, fax, 
mail or web. Respondents are asked to provide written feedback on the problem. The 




for the second round. The responses from the second round can be used to help structure 
a third round, if necessary (Lambert et al., 2007). Generally, two to three rounds are 
carried out but may vary depending on the issue being studied and the type of Delphi 
design (Hasson & Keeney, 2011). There is no guarantee that the Delphi technique will 
result in a consensus among participants concerning the issue being studied, however it 
does succeed in generating a framework of the main problems (Lambert et al., 2007). 
 
3.3.3 Sampling Design 
One of the marks of a qualitative study is the use of purposeful sampling (Patton, 
2002). This sampling design confines specific types of people who can provide the 
desired information, either because they are the only ones who have it, or conform to 
some criteria set by the researcher (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). This study utilizes this 
method to identify the participants for this research. The criteria set for this reason by the 
author are: 
1. Participants have to have an understanding of the issues surrounding the 
research topic. This was verified by two conditions. First, the requirement was 
for the participants to have at least a bachelor’s degree in their respective 
fields. Second, they were to have at least two years of work experience in the 
post-2001 Afghanistan. 
2. They have to be middle to high ranking officials – for instance department 
heads, directors, presidents, CEOs, advisors, program officers/managers or the 




organizations and private firms involved with the reconstruction and 
development activities of Afghanistan. 
 
Creswell (2003) mentions that the sample size for a study varies by the type of 
study – approximately 15 for experiment, 30 for a correlational study that relates 
variables, and 350 for a survey study. However, for the Delphi technique the sample size 
could range from 5 to 30 (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Linstone & Turoff have stated that in 
the original RAND effort a Delphi was sent to 5 to 15 experts asked to rank in order the 
critical top ten targets and explain why each was so important (Linstone & Turoff, 2011). 
The number of participants to be included for this study was set to be 10. This is a decent 
number considering the position and status of the participants chosen for this study. 
 
3.3.4 Participation Rate 
In order to collect the required data, a total of forty-six individuals meeting the 
above set criteria for this study were identified. These individuals were informed of this 
study and asked for their kind participation. However, out of this group of forty-six only 
nine individuals participated in the first round. Thus, the response rate of the participants 
for this round was about 19 percent. For the second round, a total of eight individuals 
participated out of the group of nine from the first round. Though, the numbers of 
participants in both cases were below the set number of 10 for this study, however it was 






3.3.5 Case Studies 
A case study research is the study of a real-life case within a specific setting (Yin, 
2009). Some researchers (Stake, 1995) argue that ‘case study research is not a 
methodology but a choice of what is to be studied’, however other researchers argue that 
it is a ‘strategy of inquiry, a methodology, or a complete research strategy’ (Creswell, 
2013; Yin, 2009). Thus, it could be contended that a ‘case study research is a qualitative 
approach where a researcher explores a real-life object of study in depth’ (Creswell, 
2013). 
The types of cases selected for this study are what Stake (1995) call as 
instrumental cases. These cases serve to understand a specific problem or an issue within 
a given context. Further, the type of case study adopted for this research is the collective 
case study, where multiple cases are selected to study the issue/s under concern from 
different perspectives (Creswell, 2013). The numbers of cases studied for this research 
are six. There is no definitive answer on the number of case studies to be selected for a 
research, however Creswell (2013) states that ‘researchers generally choose no more than 
four or five cases’. The criteria of case selection for this study are as follows: 
1. The cases should be reconstruction and development projects implemented 
in Afghanistan between the periods 2002 to 2013. 
2. These projects should have been implemented by one of the actors 
involved in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, for 
instance, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development, the World Bank, the United States 




3. These cases should be representatives of different regions of Afghanistan, 
i.e. East, West, North, and South. 
4. These cases should have been implemented under varying ground 
conditions, i.e. secure areas and insecure areas. 
 
3.4 Study Environment 
This study was carried out at the Purdue University of West Lafayette, Indiana. 
Purdue University is one of the top research universities both in the United States and the 
World. The research conducted in this study, which is extensively qualitative, was done 
at the West Lafayette campus. The reason for this was that the researcher was a full time 
student in the department of Building Construction Management and the resources 
required to carry out this research was easily available in this institution.  
The interviews with the subjects were carried out via email due to certain travel 
limitations. These subjects who were experts in their fields were contacted through email 
and interviewed in the same manner for this research. 
 
3.5 Approvals 
A meeting was held with the Internal Review Board (IRB) of Purdue University. 
The IRB was informed of the research and its methodology and the relevant approval was 
sought. After reviewing the documentation about the research, permission was granted to 
carry out the interviews. 
The subjects of the interview were informed about this study. The importance of 




confidentiality about their identity and whatsoever within and outside this study. After 
receiving their consent interviews were conducted. 
 
3.6 Data Collection 
Data collection could be considered a series of interrelated activities aimed at 
gathering good information to answer research questions (Creswell, 2013). The initial 
data for this study was collected from journal articles and books. The majority of these 
journal articles and books were readily available in the physical and online library of 
Purdue University. Further, websites of credible international organizations involved with 
the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, for instance USAID, World Bank, 
UN, etc., were also explored for available data and resources. 
Field data for this research was collected by questioning experts in the field. 
These ‘experts’ were individuals who had met the qualification and experience 
requirements set for this study. Identification of and access to these experts within the 
aforementioned organizations was challenging. The author, for this reason, approached 
his contacts in Afghanistan who identified and contacted these experts. These contacts 
were active middle to high ranking officials – directors, presidents, CEOs – within the 
government and international organizations. When communication was established with 
the experts, the questions round was commenced. 
This process of sending a set of questions and receiving the feedback from the 
respondents was carried out via email for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the 
limitations section of this study, the researcher could not travel to Afghanistan for certain 




convenient to them to respond to the questions with no specific deadlines. As mentioned 
earlier in this section, such flexibility would ensure that the participants have thoroughly 
answered all the questions to the full extent of their knowledge. Further, utilizing a fax to 
serve this purpose would have yielded no result as there is limited fax service available in 
Afghanistan. Similarly, using postal services would have been impractical due to time 
constraint and the distance between the two countries. 
Once the ‘experts in the field’ were identified and initial communication 
established, a set of questions consistent with the statement of objectives were 
formulated. The questions for the first iteration of Delphi were: 
 
1. What do you think are the obstacles in the process of reconstruction and 
development post-2014 within your organization? 
2. What do you think are the obstacles in the process of reconstruction and 
development post-2014 in other national or international organizations 
involved in this process? 
3. What improvement opportunities do you see for the obstacles you have 
mentioned in question 1 and 2? 
 
The questions framed were open-ended. This choice was made to ensure a better 
coverage of the different aspects of this subject, which might or might not have been 
discussed in the literature review. These questions along with a short cover letter 
outlining the task and reiterating the understanding reached in the early communications 




repeated entailing more detailed questions based on the responses received from the 
participants in round one. A list of these questions can be found in the appendix. 
The case studies were identified by searching the project databases of 
organizations active in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The projects 
accessible on these databases were available for the general public. The projects selected 
were by reading the executive summaries of the available projects on the databases of 
these organizations and matching it with the criteria set forth for this study.  
 
3.7 Analysis 
Data analysis in a qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the 
data for analysis, then reducing the data into themes and finally representing the data in 
figures, tables or discussion. This is the general process however there will be variations 
in this approach depending on the type of study and the methodology used (Creswell, 
2013). 
Following the end of the first round of Delphi and upon receiving the feedback 
from the participants, the responses were analyzed and sorted based on distinct 
information contained within each document. All the responses from each participant 
were read meticulously and reflected upon to identify the different issues and their central 
themes in terms of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. Each of the responses 
was put in a group, stacked separately and labeled with the central theme, commonalities 
and differences. Categories of different issues were created based on the information 
provided by the participants. These categories of common and varying issues were 




arranging them in a matrix, attempt was made to get a holistic view of all the issues 
surrounding the topic of research. 
The questions for round two were structured with refined parameters based on the 
information provided by the participants in round one. These questions were much more 
detailed compared to the questions of the first round. Similar to round one, these 
questions along with a cover letter were sent to the participants for their feedback. The 
responses from the second round were again thoroughly analyzed, sorted and categorized 
based on their differences and commonalities. The issues identified from the responses of 
the second round were incorporated into the matrix created earlier for the first round. 
Based on this matrix, the issues mentioned by the participants were categorized into 
several identifiable overarching issues. A list of these major issues affecting the 
reconstruction and development process of Afghanistan was created. 
To validate these issues externally, the findings of the case studies were used to 
support them. The case studies were analyzed using what Yin (2009) calls embedded 
analysis. This type of analysis looks at the specific aspects of the cases and focuses on 
the key issues present. First, a general description of all these cases and the noted issues 
was presented. This was followed by the analysis of the factors identified both through 
the Delphi technique and the case study research. These factors were analyzed through 
cross-case analysis, where all these factors were discussed within the light of each case 
study separately. A general theme of the data collection and analysis process is presented 











3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an outline of the overall framework and methodology used 
in this research. This chapter discussed the theoretical framework, research bias, the 
research methodology, the study environment, and the data collection and analysis 




CHAPTER 4. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
“Lucky is he who has been able to understand the causes of things” 
Virgil 70-19 BC: Georgics 
 
4.1 The Reality 
Reconstruction and development, specifically in a post-conflict setting, is of 
utmost importance and are determinants of the prosperous or bleak future of a state. Out 
of the 7 billion plus population of this world, about 20% lives in the rich (high-income) 
countries and the rest in the developing countries. Among these developing countries, 
where the other 80% of the world population live, some are prospering and on track to 
entering the group of the rich countries, that is, its population will have access to better 
education and health care, employment opportunities, better living environment and so 
forth. However, over a billion of the people in these countries (low-income) live in 
conditions that are of the fourteenth century – conflicts, plague, ignorance – and most of 
these countries are situated in Africa and Central Asia (Collier, 2007). Why does 
development matter in these low-income countries and why should the rest of the world 
care about it? It is because the thriving middle-income and high-income countries are 
increasingly vulnerable to these countries in this age of globalization. It is not only that 




 worse than the rest of the world. For example, the average life expectancy in these 
countries is fifty years, whereas in the other developing countries it is sixty-seven years. 
Infant mortality – the proportion of children who die before their fifth birthday – is 14 
percent in these countries, whereas in the other developing countries it is 4 percent. The 
proportion of children with symptoms of long-term malnutrition is 36 percent in these 
countries compared to 20 percent for the other developing countries. The average income 
of a person in these countries is only one-fifth of what it is in other developing countries 
(Collier, 2007). 
So low income and slow growth in these countries not only make living 
conditions worse but also spreads poverty and hopelessness, especially among the youth. 
This provides opportunities to the youth to create gangs, increasing the crime rate, and 
groups to rebel against the government. This gives rise to conflicts which in most cases 
end up in civil wars lasting for years and in some cases decades. Conflicts affect the 
region directly and the world indirectly in two ways. First, it not just results in the death 
of people due to the use of weapons but also through diseases. Conflicts create refugees 
and mass movements of these refugees in the absence of public health systems create 
epidemics. Refugees in their trek across areas and countries pick up diseases with little 
resistance and carry it to their place of refuge infecting the people already living there.  
Diseases are highly persistent and they do not stop once the fighting stops. 
Further, diseases are not limited to a certain country or region. For example, combination 
of mass rape and mass migration in wars produce ideal conditions to spread sexually 
transmitted diseases, which has been the case for HIV. Another recent example is the 




emergency by the World Health Organization (WHO). According to BBC News (2014), 
Pakistan, Cameroon, and Syria pose the greatest risk of further exportation of this virus in 
2014. All three of these countries have low-income and slow growth and have recently 
been or are still in a conflict. Attacks on the vaccine campaigns in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan have allowed the virus to spread across borders. Syria, which was polio-free for 
14 years, was re-infected with the virus from Pakistan, as a result of Pakistani insurgents 
fighting in Syria. Refugees from Syria are pouring out to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, 
and checking all of them for this virus will be impossible. This brings us to our second 
point and that is the creation of a territory that is outside the control of a recognized 
government. 
Conflicts end up in generating territories over which the government of a country 
cannot have full control. As a result these territories end up as safe havens for terrorist 
groups and drug traffickers. Ninety-five percent of the world’s drugs are produced in the 
conflict countries. Further, the activities of these terrorist groups are not limited to the 
region they are based in but are also global – for example, the incidents of 9/11, the 
London bombing, and so forth. Conflicts may incur varying costs to the country and the 
region depending on its magnitude, however, a typical civil war would cost $64 billion to 
the country and its neighbors (Collier, 2007). Conflicts not only affect the economy of a 
country but the region in general, and the economy of a region can affect the economy of 
the world itself. So, it is not that development in these low-income countries is just a 
local or regional problem but it is a global one that needs to be fixed. 
As has been noted in the literature review part of this study, there are many 




projects and programs. It is vital to identify these factors in order to ensure an efficient 
and productive development process. Identification of these factors for this study was 
carried out through interviews and analysis of case studies of projects implemented in 
Afghanistan. The following section discusses the interviews that were conducted for this 
study, followed by case studies and the relevant discussions. 
 
4.2 The Interviewees 
As a result of the confidentiality agreement between the author and the 
participants, no information about the individuals who have participated in this study will 
be disclosed. However, to establish data validity and reliability and to outline the range of 
the data collected; brief profile of the organizations where the participating interviewees 
are currently engaged is provided below: 
1. Ministry Of Finance (Government of Afghanistan) 
“The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for the management and execution 
of the budget, collection of taxes, organization and control of public expenditure and 
payments to the government. The Ministry of Finance, as the responsible body for public 
finance and expenditure, has increased its efforts on coordination and management of 
international financial assistance to Afghanistan and in convincing donors to channel 
more funds through the government treasury for the reconstruction and development of 
Afghanistan.” (Ministry of Finance, 2014). 
2. Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) 
Formerly known as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 




encourage the country's international trade and to lead Canada’s international 
development and humanitarian assistance” (DFATD, 2014a). Canada has spent hundreds 
of millions of dollars in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan post-2001. 
The DFATD’s work focused on “supporting basic services, infrastructure, rural 
development, community development councils, humanitarian assistance, democratic 
governance, investing in the future of children & youth, security, the rule of law, and 
human rights” (DFATD, 2014b). 
3. United States Department of Commerce (USDC) 
“The Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (Task Force) of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce facilitates and coordinates the Department’s activities that 
are designed to help Afghanistan develop a sustainable economy. Its efforts focus on 
helping Afghanistan develop a commercial legal environment that supports trade, 
investment and private sector-led growth, a more capable and competitive private sector, 
and stronger U.S.-Afghan commercial ties” (USDC, 2014). 
4. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 
“UNOPS has supported the Government of Afghanistan in collaboration with 
donor governments, UN organizations and other partners. By providing sustainable 
infrastructure, procurement and project management services, UNOPS support the 
Government with its national reconstruction and development efforts, focusing on the 
promotion of national ownership and capacity development. In Afghanistan, UNOPS has 
constructed and rehabilitated over 10,000 kilometers of road, rehabilitated airports and 
hospitals, and designed and constructed schools for higher education” (UNOPS, 2014). 




5. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
The cross-cutting themes that are the areas of focus of UNFPA in Afghanistan are 
Reproductive Health, Gender Based Violence, and Population & Development. The 
UNFPA has supported many projects in the aforementioned areas in Afghanistan in 
partnership with the Afghan Government and various Non-Governmental Organizations 
(UNFPA, 2014).  
6. International Home Finance and Development (IHFD) 
IHFD is a limited liability construction company based in Denver, Colorado, 
USA. IHFD's main areas of operation in Afghanistan have been: 
a. “Design, partial manufacturing, installation as well as operation and maintenance of 
renewable energy systems such as solar power, wind power and hydro power. 
b. Design, installation and operation of environmental technologies such as wastewater 
treatment systems, solid waste management systems and heating and cooling systems. 
c. Production and marketing of alternative, "Green" construction technologies. 
d. Housing development and finance. 
e. Construction management and finance” (IHFD, 2014). 
7. Appleton Consulting 
“Appleton Consulting Inc. (ACI) is an international business consulting company 
based in Afghanistan that focuses on enabling unique business solutions for emerging and 
developing market sectors. ACI provides a wide range of services for its Afghan and 
international clients including business management, strategic partnership development, 
and supply chain management. ACI has worked with over 70 Afghan companies, the 




for Project Services (UNOPS), the Government of Afghanistan, the Canadian Embassy in 
Kabul, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Aga Khan Foundation, U.S 
coalition forces, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Afghanistan International Bank (AIB)” (Appleton 
Consulting, 2014). 
8. Think Renewables 
“Think Renewables, Inc. (TRI) is a United States based company that develops 
technologies to help solve current problems and promote sustainable development with 
Afghanistan as one of its areas of operations. All the profits of TRI are donated to Charity 
Help International to support its humanitarian work in the country where it is selling its 
products” (Think Renewables, 2014). 
9. Abdulhai Gardezi Construction Firm (ACF) 
ACF is a local Afghan construction firm that has operated in the country since 
2006. ACF has implemented a number of infrastructure and vertical projects for different 
donors in Afghanistan including United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACF, 2014). 
 
4.3 Analysis of the Interview Data 
After receiving the feedback of the participants for both rounds of the interviews, 
analysis of these responses was commenced. Each response was carefully and critically 
reviewed and the terms and phrases describing a particular issue by the participant were 
noted down in a table. This process was carried for all the responses of the participants of 
this study. The table highlighting the terms and phrases used by the participants to 




After completion of this initial phase of data analysis, the produced table of the 
specific terms and phrases was analyzed. A certain commonality of issues could be 
observed in these terms and phrases. Therefore, all the issues in this table were 
categorized into their respective overarching issues. This categorization of the various 
issues can be observed in the table present in Appendix D. A summary of the overarching 
issues identified through analysis of the collected data from these interviews is presented 
in table 4.1 below. Further, the number of participants having mentioned a certain issue 
in their responses can also be observed in this table. 
 
Table  4.1. Issues Identified through Analysis of the Interview Data 
 















1 Security Challenge 8 
2 Qualified Human Capital 8 
3 Government Capacity 7 
4 Investment Risk 7 
5 Corruption 7 
6 Development Budget Reduction 6 
7 Economic Growth 5 
8 Policy Reforms 5 
9 Transparency & Accountability 4 
10 Government-Donor Coordination 3 
11 Turnover 1 
 
 
4.4 Case Studies 
The case studies analyzed for this study were all implemented in Afghanistan by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and were accessed 




Each case was analyzed individually and the existing issues were noted down. A brief 
summary of these cases and the associated issues are presented in the following tables. 
 
Table  4.2. Case Study 1 - Kabul to Kandahar Highway 
(Source: USAID, Audit of the Kabul to Kandahar Highway Reconstruction Activities 
Financed by USAID/Afghanistan’s Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services 
Program, 2004) 
CASE STUDY 1 
PROJECT Kabul to Kandahar Highway 
OBJECTIVE 
Implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities 
and Services (REFS) program, the aim of the project was to 
promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing 
infrastructure in Afghanistan. 
LOCATION 
East to Southwest of Afghanistan – passing through Kabul, 
Kandahar, Wardak, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces 
ESTIMATED COST $269 million 
ORIGINAL 
DURATION 
September 2002 to December 2004 (project was completed at 
the end of 2005) 
PROJECT SCOPE 
The project, awarded to Louis Berger Group, Inc. (LBGI) by 
USAID, consisted of removing the old road surface, survey, 
design, and reconstruction of a segment (389 kilometers) of 
the Kabul-Kandahar Highway along with bridges (6), 




• Personnel Competence 
• Project Design 





Table  4.3. Case Study 2 - Kandahar to Herat Highway 
(Source: USAID, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat 
Highway under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services Program, 2006) 
CASE STUDY 2 
PROJECT Kandahar to Herat Highway 
OBJECTIVE 
Implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities 
and Services (REFS) program, the aim of the project was to 
promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing 
infrastructure in Afghanistan. 
LOCATION 
South to Northwest of Afghanistan – passing through 
Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, and Herat provinces 
ESTIMATED COST $257 million 
ORIGINAL 
DURATION 
September 2002 to December 2005 (project was completed in 
mid-2007) 
PROJECT SCOPE 
This USAID project, also awarded to Louis Berger Group, Inc. 
(LBGI), like the Kabul-Kandahar Highway consisted of the 
following activities: 
• Demining the highway right-of-way 
• Removing the old road surface 
• Surveying and designing the highway 
• Mobilizing camp sites and asphalt making plants 
• Constructing the new highway (326 kilometers), including 
culverts, causeways, and bridges (4). 
MAJOR ISSUES 
• Security 
• Project Management 
• Funding 
• Personnel Competence 





Table  4.4. Case Study 3 - Strategic Provincial Roads 
(Source: USAID, Final Report Evaluation of USAID’s Strategic Provincial Roads 
Southern and Eastern SPR-SEA Program, 2011) 
CASE STUDY 3 
PROJECT Strategic Provincial Roads – Southern & Eastern Afghanistan 
OBJECTIVE 
The Strategic Provincial Roads (SPR) was part of the 
reconstruction program of Afghanistan aimed at increasing 
stability and security in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan by 
rehabilitating provincial roads and improving subcontractor 
capacity to build and maintain roads. 
LOCATION Eastern and Southern Afghanistan 
ESTIMATED COST $269.5 million 
DURATION 2007 to 2011 (terminated) 
PROJECT SCOPE 
The SPR project, awarded to International Relief and 
Development, Inc. (IRD) by USAID, was expected to 
rehabilitate an estimated 1500 to 2000 kilometers of roads to 
an all-weather gravel standard. In addition, capacity building 
and community development were designed to facilitate 
construction and minimize community impact caused by road 




• Project Management 
• Personnel Turnover 
• Personnel Competence 
• Project Design 






Table  4.5. Case Study 4 - Alternative Development Program for Eastern Afghanistan 
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP) Eastern 
Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010a) 
CASE STUDY 4 
PROJECT 
Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Eastern 
Afghanistan 
OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional 
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities 
to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and 
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in 
opium economy. 
LOCATION Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan provinces 
ESTIMATED COST $118.4 million 
DURATION February 2005 to June 2009 
PROJECT SCOPE 
Awarded to Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) by USAID, 
this project consisted of: 
• Improving rural roads to connect farms to the markets 
• Renewal of irrigation infrastructure 
• Improvement of agricultural production 
• Rehabilitation of potential irrigable land 
• Assisting small to medium enterprises with business skills 
MAJOR ISSUES 
• Personnel Competence 









Table  4.6. Case Study 5 - Alternative Development Program for Northern Afghanistan 
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP) 
Northern Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010b) 
CASE STUDY 5 
PROJECT 
Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Northern 
Afghanistan 
OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional 
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities 
to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and 
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in 
opium economy. 
LOCATION Badakhshan and Takhar provinces 
ESTIMATED COST $60 million 
DURATION 2005 to 2009 
PROJECT SCOPE 
The project was awarded to PADCO by USAID and consisted 
of the following activities: 
• Infrastructure construction/rehabilitation (roads, bridges, 
canals) 
• Construction of structures (veterinary clinics, root cellars) 
• Improvements in agricultural productions 
• Agribusiness development (feedlot, walnut processing, 
potato seed production, marketing) 
MAJOR ISSUES 
• Project Management 
• Project Design 
• Personnel Competence 
• Personnel 
• Corruption 





Table  4.7. Case Study 6 - Alternative Development Program for Southern Afghanistan 
(Source: USAID, Evaluation Report of Alternative Development Program (ADP) 
Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010c) 
CASE STUDY 6 
PROJECT 
Alternative Development Program (ADP) – Southern 
Afghanistan 
OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this project was to accelerate the regional 
economic development in ways that provide new opportunities 
to the population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy, and 
soften the socio-economic shockwaves of the reduction in 
opium economy. 
LOCATION Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan provinces 
ESTIMATED COST $162 million 
DURATION 2005 to 2009 
PROJECT SCOPE 
The activities for this USAID project, awarded to 
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), consisted of: 
• Construction/rehabilitation of infrastructure projects 
(Lashkar Gah airport runway, electrical substation, roads, 
irrigation canals) 
• Improvements in agricultural productions 




• Personnel Competence 
• Project Design 
• Personnel Turnover 







4.5 Identified Factors 
Based on the analysis of the data from the interviews and the case studies, the 
following factors have been found to impact reconstruction and development activities in 
Afghanistan. The rationale behind the selection of these factors is the shared 
commonality of these factors among the list of the issues identified through the use of the 
two research methods applied in this study. 
1. Security 
2. Mismanagement 
3. Personnel Competence 
4. Personnel Turnover 
5. Corruption 
6. Accountability 
7. Government-Donor Coordination 
 
4.6 Analysis of the Identified Factors 
1. Security 
Security has been a major obstacle in implementing projects affecting them not 
only in terms of completion on time but also quality and cost. It resulted in limited 
number of site visits for the first case study. The site visits that were made for this project 
were either under very tight security or from air using helicopters. The outcome of this 
was increased project cost and poor quality control. Efforts were made to increase 
monitoring personnel for this project from 2 to 10; however the security situation 




work and living conditions were improved, however this only resulted in filling only one 
additional position (USAID, 2004). Similarly, in the second case study, which was 
initially considered to be in a rather secure area than the first case study, deteriorating 
security conditions resulted in staff turnover affecting the quality and timely completion 
of the project. Further, the security situation increased the security cost of the project 
resulting in an increase in the overall cost of the project itself. The first case study and the 
second case study projects were both implemented under the Rehabilitation of Economic 
Facilities and Services (REFS) program, which was initially estimated to cost $155 
million, however security being one of the reasons, increased this initial cost to $730 
million. In addition, both of the projects were scheduled to be completed by the end of 
2004 and 2005 respectively; however the first case study project was completed at the 
end of 2005 and the second case study project in mid-2007 (USAID, 2006). 
South-east and southern parts of Afghanistan are relatively more insecure than the 
rest of the country. The third case study project suffered immensely from the insecurity in 
these areas. Although, security issues were addressed in the proposal through community 
outreach programs, however this approach yielded positive results in only certain areas. 
Overall, this project suffered from 928 security incidents – deadly military attacks, road-
side bombs, and kidnappings – which resulted in 127 deaths and 258 injuries between 
2007 and 2011. These attacks were sporadic and differed between provinces, however the 
highest number of incidents were in two provinces – Paktika (122) and Helmand (117) – 
and the lowest number of incidents were in Nangarhar and Laghman. Speculations point 
to the varying levels of community support for this difference in these provinces, 




the others. These security incidents resulted in a proportionate increase in the security 
costs of the subcontractors. In some cases, the subcontractors could not mobilize their 
equipment and personnel to the job site. This resulted in no progress payments affecting 
the subcontractors’ cash-flow, which in turn caused the termination of the contract by 
convenience or default. In addition, parts of the project that could be worked on could not 
be visited by the senior managers, resulting in poor quality control and delayed decision 
making delaying the project completion itself (USAID, 2011). 
Similarly, in the sixth case study, the substation upgrade in Lashkar Gah, 
Helmand province, which included addition of distribution lines and transformers, could 
not be completed because of rocket attacks. The security situation resulted in poor project 
oversight as personnel were confined to their compounds. Furthermore, some activities of 
this project were forced to shut earlier in the Kandahar region due to increased insurgent 
attacks (USAID, 2010c). In summary, the security situation resulted in increased project 
costs, project delays, and project termination affecting the reconstruction and 
development program in many areas. However, case studies four and five did not suffer 
from security incidents, compared to case study six, as they were situated in relatively 
stable areas. Yet case study four was considered a success whereas case study five was 
considered a failure. Thus, the security situation is not the only factor leading to success 
or failure of a project, which is discussed in the following sections. 
 
2. Mismanagement 
Mismanagement has been observed to be consistent in many projects in both 




quality control. The Louis Berger Group (LBGI) and USAID, for instance, did not fully 
monitor the first case study project activities, project timeline, or the quality of the work. 
The performance of the contractor was not fully monitored to ensure that the approved 
quality control and assurance programs were strictly followed. Further, the quality testing 
laboratory of the contractor was not inspected and thus the testing done was not in 
compliance with standards. LBGI had not properly trained its personnel for this project. 
For example, when cracks were noted in the asphalt layer due to paving during bad 
weather or cold asphalt during compaction, the contractor was not asked to stop work or 
remove the layer. This lack of adherence to project quality control and assurance 
requirements resulted in 30 kilometers of asphalt to be removed due to quality issues, 
pushing back the project completion date. As mentioned in the security part above, 
efforts were made to increase monitoring personnel for this project from 2 to 10, however 
only 3 positions could be filled due to the security and working conditions. However, the 
roles of these available monitoring personnel were poorly defined and/or had other duties 
in addition to monitoring this project (USAID, 2004). This points to the fact that this 
project was not managed well by LBGI, despite all the challenges that were known and 
present on the ground.   
There were no quality issues reported for the second case study as in contrast to 
the first case study. This could be related to the location of this project being in a 
relatively secure area compared to the project in the first case study and the willingness 
of personnel to work in this area. Yet, this project was completed in mid-2007, more than 
a year after the original project end date. The reason for this delay was an increase in the 




assessment of the old road and bridges due to demining issues (USAID, 2006). This 
alludes that certain challenges were not taken into consideration when this project was 
planned and appropriated. 
On the contrary, the third case study proposal was well prepared. The proposal 
took into consideration the security issues in remote areas and addressed this issue 
through community outreach program. The low skill level labor and subcontractor issues 
were addressed through capacity building and training. Similarly, other variables such as 
field conditions, labor pool, ethnic and political factors were also taken into account. The 
security personnel and labors for this project were to be hired from the local 
communities. This was thought to improve the local economy and increase the local 
community support for the project reducing any security risks. The unskilled labors were 
to be provided hands on mentoring in the field and the subcontractors were to be trained 
in project management in Kabul. All these variables increased the complexity of the 
project and required a well-organized and efficient plan to render it practical. However, 
the one issue in this regard was the system of authority delegation to the field for 
decision-making and implementation (USAID, 2011). 
Although, International Relief and Development (IRD) had prior experience in 
Afghanistan and had taken key factors into account but the problematic issue was the 
organizational structure. The Chief of Party (COP), located in Kabul, was the main 
decision-maker, making the decision-making process centralized. The poor management 
structure could not address the realities in the field. It slowed down the information flow 
and decision-making resulting in delays in resolving field problems. For instance, the 




of these provincial roads. The design criteria used for the SPR roads was the same as for 
the first and second case studies. However, rectification of this problem on time failed 
because of the centralized organizational structure and slow flow of communication 
between the field staff and senior managers. As mentioned in the security factor, senior 
managers could not visit the field due to the security situation. This further emphasized 
for the need to decentralize mid-level management decision making. As critical decisions 
were passed up the chain of command, this overwhelmed the senior area managers with 
day to day issues. This preoccupation with the details of daily management obscured their 
broader view and direction of the program. However, if the field offices were staffed with 
expat managers, many problems could have been prevented. The general feeling in the 
field was a lack of support from the management in Kabul, resulting in a breakdown of 
confidence between the field staff and the senior managers (USAID, 2011).  
The third case study was conceived with the notion that violence was decreasing. 
This particular notion was perhaps the reason that no significant risk analysis or 
contingency planning was carried out for this project. As mentioned earlier, security 
attacks increased heavily in 2009, especially in the Helmand and Paktika provinces. The 
security issue, as mentioned above, was to be addressed through the community outreach 
program. However, the community mobilization teams focused more on the Community 
Development Councils (CDC) and formal political structures than on ‘Shuras’ (local 
community councils). This was perhaps due to poor understanding of the traditional rural 
social and political structures. The result was a lack of preparation for the community 
groundwork before the arrival of road program teams. This may have been one of the 




could have suspended the project and transferred all equipment and operations to an 
alternative project. This could have motivated the community to help deal with the 
security issues, knowing that because of the insecurity they will not have roads. However, 
because of a lack of functional decision-making process, which resulted in a series of 
poor decisions, the third case study was eventually terminated in 2011 (USAID, 2011). 
Similar to the first and second case studies, the third case study had also quality 
control issues. The quality control laboratories were in many cases not up to standards. 
Often times, the test results despite not being up to standards were recorded as being in 
compliance. This problem was recognized by USAID and in 2010 hired TetraTech to 
establish third party QA process. However, the benefit of this action was infinitesimal as 
the project was terminated in 2011 (USAID, 2011). 
The fifth case study also suffered from mismanagement. The program operations 
began in November 2005, whereas the winter limited operational activities until May 
2006. The project design, approval, and implementation did not confirm with the climate 
realities of northern Afghanistan. This project had both infrastructure and agricultural 
activities. However, the results of these activities were found unsatisfying. In 
infrastructure, the bridges seemed well constructed but the roads were of poor quality, 
specifically because of asphalting problems during unfavorable weather. A canal, the 
Baharak Power canal, was constructed in unstable soil on a steep slope. The construction 
material did not meet the project specification requirements (cement to sand ration of 1:7 
compared to 1:4 required). Further, large boulders and breaches were observed in the 
canal after completion. Its walls collapsed after seasonal floods and seepage eroded 




power plant and irrigation fields, failed to do so. Further, it threatened a road that was just 
close by to this canal. In addition, root cellars constructed for the farmers to store 
potatoes and food in general were a failure as they were conducive to fungus. The 
evaluation team of this project expressed serious reservations about the metrics used to 
guide and measure progress and success (USAID, 2010b). 
In agricultural activities, vegetable seeds and fertilizers were distributed. 
However, some crops were serious economic disappointment as local field testing was 
not carried out. Farmers in Badakhshan started suffering losses in potato crops as a result 
of Colorado Beetle, which they blamed PADCO for introducing to their environment. 
Further, fruit saplings were distributed to the farmers, however no training in terms of 
orchard management was provided to them (USAID, 2010b).  
PADCO developed a negative image not just because of the failure of the 
aforementioned activities, but also because of its heavy security footprint and the relative 
high cost. The high security profile and extravagant lifestyle of PADCO was found 
intimidating by the locals, as Badakhshan was considered a rather secure area and other 
NGOs and foundations were able to operate effectively with unarmed guards and low 
lifestyle footprint. People saw this act of PADCO as the diversion of resources that were 
supposed to help them (USAID, 2010b). Thus, this project is noted to be poorly planned 
and monitored, not taking into account the realities on the ground and the local ethnic and 
cultural factors. Further, due to the poor judgment and decision-making of the PADCO 
managers, this project did not receive much support from the local community, which is a 





3. Personnel Competence 
As mentioned in the literature part of this study, Afghanistan lost most of its 
skilled resources during the three decades of fighting and disturbances, and opportunities 
to replenish this gap was missing. This lack of local qualified human capital and the 
inexperience of international personnel in an unpredictable and challenging environment 
like Afghanistan were felt during the reconstruction and development period of post-
2002. As mentioned earlier, many of these projects suffered from mismanagement and a 
lack of proper quality control and assurance programs, which indicate a lack of 
experience and/or knowledge of the field. 
In the first case study, both the USAID and LBGI did not carry out an effective 
quality control and assurance program. The personnel were not trained properly and as a 
result laboratory testing was not done in compliance with standards, which resulted in the 
removal of 30 kilometers of asphalt. Consequently, a contract was signed with another 
international company for monitory and advisory services in May 2004 (USAID, 2004). 
However, the same issue was not experienced in the second case study. This probably 
could be as a result of the lessons learned from the first case study. 
The third case study had a well prepared proposal demonstrating the experience of 
IRD in Afghanistan. However, the management was not structured well to address the 
complexity of the project and the realities in the field. Further, although the 
subcontractors were selected using the industry norms, but in most cases they were 
financially and materially impacted due to underestimating of the Statement of Work of 
the project. These subcontractors were responsible both for the design and construction of 




codes were much higher than what these subcontractors were familiar with. Those 
subcontractors who recognized the higher cost liability of this change submitted higher 
bids but many subcontractors underbid their projects without fully understanding their 
responsibilities. The selection of these lowest bidders resulted in many problems. For 
example, the submitted design sets by the subcontractors and their consultants were 
rejected multiple times resulting in much delays. In addition, the design data provided to 
the subcontractors was in the form of ‘aerial photogrammetric imaging’. However, the 
subcontractors had no prior experience with this kind of data and thus it took them two 
months to verify this data on the field. In addition, as mentioned previously, this project 
suffered from the incompetence of personnel involved, such as lack of jobsite 
management and supervision; lack of contingency planning and risk management; limited 
capacity of field engineers to adequately supervise subcontractors causing delayed 
payments and hence cash-flow problems; and reliance on subcontractors to provide 
quality designs (USAID, 2011). All these factors compounded contributed ultimately to 
the termination of the project. 
Case studies four, five, and six also faced similar issues. The case study four 
personnel showed a lack of hands on experience on fruit trees establishment and fruit 
orchard management (USAID, 2010a). Similarly, the case study five and six personnel 
did not provide these trainings to the farmers which resulted in a reported loss of 15-50% 
of saplings for the latter (USAID, 2010c). In the fourth case study, one important facility 
missing was the cold storage warehouse for fruits and vegetables. This resulted in 




Pakistan for cold storage to re-sell in the Afghan market during off-season (USAID, 
2010a). 
The design and quality of infrastructure and buildings of the fifth case study were 
particularly egregious. Its roads were of very poor quality, the canals were poorly 
constructed, and the root cellars were conducive to fungus. These establishments 
rendered useless almost as soon as they were constructed (USAID, 2010b). In the sixth 
case study, the short duration of many project activities prevented a lasting impact on the 
economy of the region. Many of these activities were not designed to be sustainable 
beyond the project conclusion. With no transition plan, the assumption was that the locals 
would take over without any technical or financial support. However, this led to the 
disappointment of many people involved in this project (USAID, 2010c). Thus, if these 
projects and its many activities were planned and monitored properly, not just the local 
people but all Afghanistan would have benefited much more than what is possible now. 
4. Personnel Turnover 
Personnel turnover might have been one of the reasons for some of the projects 
not accomplishing its stated objectives. All of the projects, however, did not suffer from 
this factor. The first case study project had high rates of staff turnover, which could be 
related to the security situation, living conditions, and limited tour of duty. Staff turnover 
was the main reason for this project being delayed as the issue of lack of funding was not 
addressed on time due to frequent change in key project personnel (USAID, 2006). 
Likewise, the third case study project also experienced high turnover of key personnel. 
The average tenure of senior managers in this project was 8.3 months. Among these, of 




(USAID, 2011). The sixth case study project, similarly, had high personnel turnover at 
the beginning of the project making it difficult to maintain a focus on the project goals 
and objectives (USAID, 2010c). Had staff turnover been lower, the management 
problems discussed earlier might have been lesser resulting in better outcomes. 
5. Corruption 
The literature part of this study mentioned that corruption remains endemic in 
Afghanistan, and that there is a lack of political will to tackle it. Further, the donor 
community is also blamed for it because of poorly conceived development projects and 
weak oversight. In the fifth case study project, PADCO bribed provincial or national 
government departments to take premature control of an activity so as to avoid making 
repairs to bring the activity up to project standards (USAID, 2010b). In the third case 
study project, each subcontractor was required as part of the contract to provide support 
facilities for the IRD field staff. However, in some cases, for instance in Kandahar, IRD 
engineers lived with the subcontractor’s field staff in the subcontractor’s compound. As 
was mentioned earlier, many test results were recorded as being in compliance where in 
reality they were not up to standards (USAID, 2010c). So, the living and working 
conditions for these engineers were such that it favored the subcontractor. 
6. Accountability 
The absence of accountability eases the way for corruption and mismanagement. 
Were accountability properly practiced in Afghanistan, most of the aforementioned 
internal (within the human control) problems could have been prevented or rectified, 
resulting in better outcomes. The quality issues in the first case study project resulted in 




resources (USAID, 2004). In the third case study project, the implementing mechanism 
was a ‘cooperative agreement’ rather than a ‘contract’. The result was less accountability 
and responsiveness to USAID. Therefore, much of the management problems that were 
present in this project were not known by USAID within time. Further, as mentioned 
above, the IRD field staff was living with the subcontractor’s field staff in their 
compound (USAID, 2011). As a result, this literally forced the IRD staff to overlook the 
quality issues in the provincial roads for the reason mentioned in the above section. 
Similarly, in the fifth case study project, government departments were bribed to take 
control of activities that were either incomplete or not in compliance with quality 
requirements of the project. In addition, PADCO expended much resource on a high 
security footprint and extravagant lifestyle in an area where other organizations were 
operating effectively without similar arrangements. Based on the analysis of the 
evaluation team for this project, it was stated that much of the work done by PADCO will 
not have long-term consequence. Further, the cost-benefit value of the project was 
questioned as the estimated value of the benefits was in the order of $40 million for a cost 
of $60 million (USAID, 2010b). Thus, a lack or improper enforcement of accountability 
resulted in many personnel of these projects to not perform their duties responsibly. 
7. Government-Donor Coordination 
A lack of Government-Donor coordination has affected the implemented projects 
in two ways. First, it has resulted in duplication of efforts and resources in some areas, as 
mentioned in the literature part of this study. Second, a lack of involvement of the 
government agencies have led to the underdevelopment of skills and capacities of the 




the fourth case study, the relative government agencies were not involved in the design 
and planning of this program (USAID, 2010a). Their inclusion could have provided some 
local insight that might have resulted in a better design and planning of the program. In 
the fifth case study, the evaluators have expressed their views that the support and 
follow-on of the government agencies could have greatly improved the results of the 
project. The Baharak Power Canal failed to deliver the water to the power station and 
irrigation lands downstream, as mentioned earlier. The officials of this power station 
stated their unawareness of the details of the work done in this activity and complained 
about the absence of relevant documents that should have been provided to them. The 
Director of Water Management said that not only did PADCO not coordinate with his 
department but also refused to leave blueprints, specifications, or record of what was 
done for the project within his jurisdiction. The Director of Public Works claimed that his 
department was wholly ignored despite its obvious jurisdiction over many project 
activities. The government officials criticized PADCO for a lack of coordination and 
arrogance. PADCO often time remained absent from coordination meetings. As a result 
many activities of this project were stated to have no long-term significance (USAID, 
2010b). Similarly, in the sixth case study, department of Agriculture and Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development indicated some involvement with the project but wished 
for more involvement and consultation. The long-term impact and sustainability of this 
project was questioned as there was no transition plan after project completion, as it was 
assumed that the local government agencies would take over without any further 





4.7 Chapter Summary 
Discussion in this chapter entailed the factors impeding and proving challenging 
to the process of reconstruction and development. These factors were identified based on 
the interviews carried out with the organizations involved in this process and a number of 
case studies of projects implemented on the ground. Brief profiles of the participating 
organizations and summaries of the case studies were provided. This was followed by a 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
“Study the past if you would define the future”. 
Confucius (551 BC - 479 BC) 
“The greatest challenge to any researcher is stating the problem in a way that will 
allow a solution”. 
Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) 
 
5.1 New Outlooks 
The underlying idea of this study was to identify the key factors that would affect 
and slow down the reconstruction and development process in a post-conflict zone, in 
particular in Afghanistan, through interviews with people involved in this process and 
case studies of projects implemented on the ground. This study has discussed and alluded 
to the complexity and uncertainty of this process. The different challenges present in a 
post-conflict setting – the varying interests and agendas of different countries and 
organizations, the capacity of the local institutions, the security and stability uncertainty, 
corruption, infrastructure, the unknown and challenging terrain – have proved to be 
difficult to the international community to overcome. This has had varying level of 
outcomes, however in most cases the stated objectives of the projects and programs were 




The international community has labelled these failures in all development cases 
as the lessons learned. This rhetoric has been repeated from time to time; however it 
displays a lack of understanding of the situation on the ground and the development 
process in general. In the author’s opinion, what the international community tends to 
forget is that this reconstruction and development opportunity that the post-conflict state 
gets has a limited time frame. Thus, it is imperative to use this window of opportunity in 
the best way possible in order to achieve the set goals by the international community and 
the aspirations of the post-conflict communities. The international community ought to 
know that all the issues in this process are dynamic and interconnected and therefore 
requires a holistic approach where all sectors play an equal role in forming the framework 
and foundation of an effective and productive development process. 
This holistic approach would require a considerable amount of planning on a 
micro and macro level to integrate the efforts of all the parties involved in the 
reconstruction and development program. This planning would need to identify and 
address the numerous factors surrounding this process. The proper assessment of these 
factors and their management could sway the projects and programs toward success 
contributing to the overall success of the process itself.  
If the analysis of the collected data for this study is correct, then the factors 
mentioned in the previous chapter would be pivotal to the success or failure of 
reconstruction and development program in Afghanistan, and other post-conflict states in 
general. This argument may not be something new in this field; however what is really 
needed is an alternative way of thinking to better manage this process and the factors 




comfort zones and start thinking of ways that could produce better outcomes. This would 
mean challenging their own knowledge and experience and adapting to the reality on the 
ground. This would result in a proactive approach that would take into account the 
complexity of the situation and produce results that are more conducive and sustainable. 
For the factors identified in this study, the author has presented suggestions in the 
following sections that could be used to improve the outcome of these factors. These 
suggestions should not be considered independent interventions but rather added 
measures to the current endeavors and strategies of the international community and 
governments to achieve security, stability, and an improved reconstruction and 
development process. 
1. Security 
The author believes that for lasting peace in Afghanistan, approaches on three 
fronts are vital – diplomacy, development, and military. The last decade (2002 – 2012) 
has shown that pursuing only military engagement to tackle the insurgency is not a viable 
option. Thus there is a need to politically engage these groups. As Barakat et al. (2008) 
have suggested, this process will need to involve directly the Afghan government and key 
insurgent representatives with any needed assistance from the international community. 
Furthermore, key stakeholders would need to be assured that any negotiations with the 
insurgents would ultimately be in their favor and contribute to an improved stability of 
the region. The international community would need to extend its support to the 
government in this process to show that it is a capable and credible partner. 
In addition to negotiations with the insurgents, the government needs to engage in 




are still a functional part of the society in much of Afghanistan. Similarly, the clerics, 
mullahs, and imams still hold influence in much of rural areas where illiteracy is the 
highest. These figures in general pass message of sorts to the public during the Friday 
prayer sermons. Further, they are also conveyors of insurgent messages and in some 
cases motivators of insurgency itself. Thus, gaining the support and confidence of these 
clerics is important to the government to not only stop the conveyance of the insurgents’ 
messages but also to persuade the people not to support the insurgents. These people 
could also serve as a source of local intelligence reporting the activities of these 
insurgents (Barakat et al., 2008).  
According to Barakat et al. (2008) many Afghans blame the government for the 
grim state of the country. With a lack of unemployment, the young Afghans who make a 
larger percentage of the population are a good source of manpower to the insurgents. 
Therefore, the government needs to focus on development projects in these rural areas to 
meet the local needs and provide life improvement opportunities to these young men. In 
addition to employment, for instance in infrastructure, agriculture and livelihood support 
programs, these young men could be provided vocational and educational training, 
adding up to the skilled workforce of the country. Further, as has been evident from the 
case studies, the support of local communities is significant for the implementation of 
projects in insecure environments. The local communities can take security measures to 
prevent the insurgents from hindering the project work. This would contribute to both the 
stability and development of the region. Therefore, the government needs to be clear and 
organized in its message and practice, especially in these rural areas. Losing the trust of 




prevent this, the government could also work on raising the awareness of the people 
about the civilian fatalities resulting from insurgent attacks. Further, they could be 
pointed to the current situation of Iraq where the sectarian violence could prove to be a 
powerful lesson to the people. 
In the author’s opinion, there are two groups of insurgents. The first are the 
moderate elements who are willing to negotiate with the government. These are the 
people with whom the Afghan government and the international community have been 
recently trying to interact and have dialogues. However, the results have not been very 
favorable so far.  The second are the hardcore extremists who do not negotiate under any 
circumstances. It is therefore necessary to substantially improve the capabilities of the 
Afghan security forces to enable them to effectively combat these hardcore insurgents. 
Doing so will not only slow down but also downsize the activities and attacks of these 
insurgents. This will further put pressure on the less extreme elements of these groups 
and, hopefully, bring them closer to the negotiations table. 
2. Mismanagement 
The author believes that the issue of mismanagement could be categorized into 
two categories. The first is mismanagement carried out by people due to negligence of 
their duties and responsibilities. Dealing with this type of mismanagement falls under the 
subject of accountability and will be discussed in a later section. The second type is 
mismanagement due to a lack of experience in new (and insecure) environments, such as 
Afghanistan, as has been noted in some of the case studies. Dealing with this type of 
mismanagement requires close involvement of the local experts. The involvement of 




insight into issues of a certain area that others might not be aware of or may foresee. 
Having information of some of the upcoming challenges and problems would provide 
time to the decision makers to devise ways of managing these risks. Further, coordinating 
the project/program plans with the local agencies and involvement of the local 
communities would ensure a less problematic and informed implementation process.  
One main mismanagement issue that has been noticed in the case studies to have 
remarkably affected the projects is the flow of information between the main office and 
field personnel. The lynchpin for this issue was noticed to be the centralized structure of 
the project hierarchy. Though, centralized structures provide ease in project management, 
especially decision making, however these structures render less effective as the project 
magnitude increases specifically in uncertain environments, where on time decision 
making is imperative to project success. It is in the author’s believe that in such 
unpredictable environments a rather dynamic project structure would yield better results. 
The project structure should remain flexible for meeting the varying needs of the project 
itself. As the project size and uncertainty on the ground increases, decision making 
should be made decentralized enabling middle level to senior managers to make on-time 
and optimal decisions. 
3. Personnel Competence 
Developing countries in general suffer from a shortage of qualified human 
resources due to substandard educational institutions, among other factors. The state of 
post-conflict countries in some cases is even worse in this regard. During the conflict 
years the primary goal of people is survival, and as the conflict extends the educated and 




make the larger percentage of population, will stay behind. Due to a dysfunctional or 
complete absence of educational institutions a generation of young men and women lose 
the opportunity to get the proper education and training to add up to the workforce of the 
country, as was the case in Afghanistan. This skill gap proves to be the most critical 
challenge during the post-conflict years as it directly affects the growth of the country 
and all other development activities. 
The international community does have capacity development programs; however 
in most cases they are donor-driven with a shorter duration rather than meeting the actual 
and long-term needs of the state (Sanyal & Babu, 2012). For this program to be 
sustainable and to contribute to sustainable development, it needs to be owned and 
managed by the developing country with the international community playing a 
supporting role. As each country have a specific set of needs and expectations from these 
programs, they need to be flexible and open to modifications as required (Murrell, 1984). 
Examples of such models that are endogenous and flexible to the changing demands of 
the market are the Botswana National Productivity Center (BNPC), the Rwandan Human 
Resources and Institutional Capacity Development Agency (HIDA), and the South 
African Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) (Hope, 2009). 
Access to technology is becoming more common in the developing countries. In 
Afghanistan, an estimated 18 million people have access to cellular phones and 2 million 
have access to internet out of an estimated 31 million population (MCIT, 2014). 
Technology could be thus used to increase the competence of local workforce. Based on 
a personal communication with one of the interviewees (February 10, 2014), it was 




capacity of human capital. With the latest developments in communication and 
collaborative technologies, expertise and training could be provided to people of all 
levels anywhere around the country, for instance using ‘Google Hangout’. These learning 
and skill development centers could be established in different regions of the country and 
connected to each other through a network. Trainers from one end of the country could 
interact with the trainees in another end. This interaction however should be of a practical 
nature with dialogue and demonstrations rather than a monologue where the expert only 
gives a lecture. Further, as mentioned above, this process should be locally owned i.e. the 
knowledge and skill of local trainers be developed and then given the task of training 
others. In this manner the activities could be tailored as per the needs of the 
institutions/country rather than a specific model provided by the donor community.  
This approach of developing competence could be of short to medium term, 
however for a long-term approach the author suggests that in addition to improving the 
quality of the local educational, vocational and training institutions in collaboration with 
the developed countries and international organizations, higher education scholarships be 
provided by the developed countries to the young men and women of the country. Of 
notice in this regard are the Fulbright and Chevening programs that provide higher 
education scholarships to qualified youth of developing countries to further enhance their 
knowledge and skill sets in different fields. The author highly emphasizes on the 
continuity of such programs and suggests that other developed countries follow a similar 
approach to assist boosting the potential of the youth of developing countries, which is 






4. Personnel Turnover 
The author is of the view that the working and living conditions of a developing 
country are the core factors for personnel turnover. A lack of proper facilities, the 
numerous social and political challenges, and the sheer amount of stress in working in an 
uncertain and unpredictable environment challenges the experience, skills, and strength 
of an individual every moment. This can be noted in the staff turnover of some of the 
case studies. Improvements can be made to these conditions however they will be limited 
due to the existing circumstances of the country itself. Incentives could be offered to 
qualified personnel; however it is an approach that may or may not achieve desired 
results. 
The author offers two suggestions in this regard – increased involvement and 
employment of qualified local staff and use of technology. Employing local staff to carry 
out the work will be more effective and productive since they would have already 
adapted to the challenging environment of a particular area. As the turnover rate of these 
local staff will be less than other national or expat staff, their presence through a longer 
period in the project will ensure better focus on and implementation of the project itself. 
A concern here would be the capability of these local personnel. As discussed above, 
these personnel could be trained to develop their skills and knowledge level to better 
meet the project requirements. The second suggestion is the use of technology between 
the head office and field office. One of the reasons for staff turnover is travelling through 
insecure areas for project monitoring and evaluation. With the technological 




internet accessibility would enable video-conferencing between the field staff and head 
office managers. The field staff could video-conference on a daily basis or as required 
with regional or head office managers to report project progress or any existing or 
potential problems. Similarly, the regional or head office managers could see the actual 
progress of work in the field. This would increase the flow of communication between 
the two levels of project staff reducing the decision making time, where required, for the 
senior managers. 
5. Corruption 
There remains no room for doubt that corruption impedes development and the 
growth of a country affecting the majority of low-income population by, among others, 
spreading hunger and poverty. Corruption, which is endemic to most of the developing 
countries, obstructs the social and economic development, as much of the public funds 
are banked overseas. Corruption can reduce tax revenues by as much as 50 percent 
reducing the funds available for public spending. It ‘reduces the quality of public services 
and infrastructure, affects government spending decisions, decreases revenues, and 
damages the confidence of the public in the rule of law’ (Otusanya, 2011). 
Tackling corruption is a critical challenge to every country, especially a post-
conflict one. Afghanistan, for instance, ranks the third most corrupt country in the world 
(Transparency International, 2014). To deal with the issue of corruption, a number of 
approaches could be used. The first could be the establishment of an anti-corruption unit. 
This unit managed by reputable members of society should have broad powers and 
extensive oversight in the government (Barakat, 2008). Further, it should have the 




also serve as a unit in identifying gaps in the government systems and procedures that are 
prone to corruption and recommend reforms in eliminating them. Such anti-corruption 
units have shown positive results in countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia (Siddiquee, 2010). 
To ensure the effectiveness of such a unit, public support will be necessary to 
report cases of corruption. This could be done in two ways. First, as suggested by one of 
the interviewees in a personal communication (February 10, 2014), online services could 
be used to report cases of corruption. As mentioned above, technology accessibility is 
becoming common in most of the developing countries. Therefore, the use of online 
services such as www.ipaidabribe.com, which is currently being used in India and 
Pakistan, could be incentivized for public use. Second, the author suggests that as the 
majority of the public own cell phones, as is the case in Afghanistan, such corruption 
reporting services could be offered through the use of phones. Corruption cases do not 
have to be necessarily reported by placing calls to the anti-corruption unit, but rather cell 
phone platforms could be developed that would ease the reporting procedure and ensure 
the anonymity of the public. 
In addition, since most of the corruption cases happen because of a complex and 
multi-departmental verification and approval processes, the author believes that provision 
of single-window services would significantly reduce it. Similarly, electronic or e-
government would also greatly help contain corruption. E-government which is a system 
of governance that has been in use in many developed countries is being implemented in 
some of the developing countries, including Afghanistan (MCIT, 2014). E-government 




can complete transactions with the government electronically without having to visit 
government offices or meet officials (Siddiquee, 2010). This could reduce corruption to a 
great extent. In addition, cell phones could also be used to make payments to the 
government offices without interacting with the government officials. A good example in 
this regard is the “Mobile Money” services provided in Afghanistan. Prior to the 
introduction of Mobile Money, as much as 30 percent of the pay checks of Afghan 
teachers and National Police, who were paid in cash, would be skimmed by third party 
agents. With Mobile Money now, users receive their pay checks directly in their phones, 
which has become a form of electronic wallet that could be used to send money to other 
users or pay electricity bills (USAID, 2014).  
Furthermore, another approach could be educating the younger generation about 
corruption at school and other educational institutions. These efforts should aim at 
teaching noble and ethical values to the youth. In addition, anti-corruption officials 
should hold dialogues, public campaigns, and seminars to raise awareness of the 
detrimental effects of corruption on the society and economy of the country, and 
encourage public participation in reporting corruption cases (Siddiquee, 2010). 
6. Accountability 
Establishment and enforcement of proper accountability measures and systems 
can significantly reduce corruption, intentional mismanagement, and misperformance 
cases. Accountability is a critical requirement in post-conflict and developing countries if 
further social and economic development is desired. Promotion and implementation of 
accountability is as an arduous process as that of corruption. To address the issue of 




the anti-corruption unit discussed above, this office be provided with extensive power 
and authority to scrutinize the activities of the public officials and other development 
actors. Further, the government and the various development agencies’ procurement and 
contracting processes be reviewed and evaluated. Similarly, the performance of middle to 
high level officials of these organizations and agencies be also assessed. The reports of 
all these investigations should be disclosed to the public. This could be done by several 
means. First, these reports could be made available on the internet. Since only the 
educated and middle to high income group of the population will have access to this 
source, these reports should also be published in journals and newspapers available to the 
local literate public. In addition, these reports could also be broadcasted on the television 
and radios to inform the percentage of population who are illiterate. Raising the 
awareness of the public at the societal level about the activities and performance of the 
government, development agencies, and their officials will help the public more actively 
participate in criticizing and providing feedback about the government, development 
agencies and their existing systems. 
7. Government-Donor Coordination 
Poor government-donor coordination can significantly inhibit effective recovery 
and development. It is imperative that all the actors involved in this process integrate and 
direct their activities towards a shared-vision driven reconstruction and development 
program. This should be a participatory process aiming to gather the input of all 
stakeholders and be open to further improvements. To achieve this goal, Barakat and 
Zyck (2009) have suggested a model to promote an effective reconstruction and 




This model which is based on the Bureau of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of 
Aceh and Nias (BRR) established in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami asks for a 
highly capable and temporary agency to oversee the process of reconstruction and 
development. This agency does not have to be a permanent agency or ministry and 
directly engage in the reconstruction and development activities itself. Rather, this 
agency should identify the most appropriate implementing partners, ensure compliance 
with the central reconstruction and development plan, monitor waste and assess the 
impact of interventions on a regular basis. This agency should be free from the influence 
of donors or the country and should have the authority to recruit or dismiss personnel as 
necessary. Upon completion of the objectives of the reconstruction and development 
program, this agency should be disbanded with its personnel employed in the public 
sector. 
Further, a committee consisting of major donor and civil society representatives 
should periodically review the performance of this agency to ensure aid effectiveness, 
quality assurance, and accountability to the people of the donor and aid recipient 
countries. In addition, community-level feedback mechanisms should be established to 
measure the overall satisfaction of the people and to further improve the outputs of the 
reconstruction and development program. Such level of participation will give the people 
a feeling of belonging to this process which could result in an increased cooperation of 
these people further improving the management of some of the issues that were 






5.2 Implications for Future Research 
Looking back at the literature and findings of this study, a number of issues come 
to mind further intriguing the curiosity as a researcher. The subject of post-conflict 
reconstruction and development has been revolving around the academicians and field 
professionals for years; however there seems to be a gap between the findings of 
academic research and the practice in the field. Reading the studies of researchers and 
reports of development agencies, there usually is a reference to the failure of 
projects/programs labelled as lessons learned. This raises the question as to why there are 
repeated failures despite the presence of much literature and experienced field 
professionals. It is apparent that there cannot be a general approach to the issue of post-
conflict reconstruction and development as the situations and circumstances of each 
country differ. However, there are commonalities among each case that could serve to 
better guide the stakeholders of this process to devise a more effective plan resulting in 
reduced failures while being conducive to the long term social, political, structural, and 
economic development. Therefore, there is a need to study the findings of both the 
academic research and field practice and identify methods to bridge the gap between the 
two. Although, attempt was made to achieve this goal in this study, however it is 
suggested that a more detailed study of each factor be carried out. Further, identifying 
similarities among post-conflict situations and finding the commonalities that could be 
extended and used in other cases should be established. 
This study identified a total of seven factors contributing to the success or failure 
of reconstruction and development projects based on interviews and case studies. 




fields and organizations involved in this process, however there were some potential 
participants who could not participate in this study due to organizational restrictions. 
Thus, it would be interesting to find out if the identified factors presented in this study 
would remain indifferent by including a different group of participants. Further, the 
selected case studies, though, were from different regions of Afghanistan, yet it did not 
completely represent Afghanistan in its entirety. There were no case studies found for 
projects that were implemented in central and central-north areas, although these areas 
are relatively secure and stable. In addition, all the case studies were projects awarded by 
USAID. No case studies of projects awarded and/or implemented by other donor 
agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the UN could be found 
for this study. It would be thought-provoking to find project reports of other donors and 
compare their performance to those of USAID. The findings of such a comparison should 
be fascinating and any difference in this regard should be evaluated against the findings 
of this study. 
The methodology used in this study was entirely qualitative with no relevance to 
any of the quantitative methods. It is yet to be found if the results from a combined 
qualitative and quantitative research design would be any different. Quantification of the 
identified issues would pave the way for statistical analysis. Using statistical analysis, the 
correlation between the issues identified and their significance should be established. 
This would further narrow down the major factors in this process, and perhaps provide 
the opportunity to work on more detailed strategies to these issues using the expertise of 




Although, this study has attempted to answer some of the questions regarding the 
subject of post-conflict reconstruction and development, however at the same time it has 
raised many others. As the well-known fiction writer Doris Lessing says: 
 
“That is what learning is. You suddenly understand something you've understood 
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Appendix B. Delphi Second Round Questions 
 
I. Interviewee A 
1. The capacity of the Afghan government is said to be underdeveloped 
(Understanding Afghanistan, Falling Short). How effective do you think 
Public Private Partnerships would prove to be? What challenges would local 
or western private sectors face in such an initiative? 
 
2. What tax issues do construction and development companies face currently? 
How could the Afghan government or the international community make 
improvements in this regard? 
 
3. Afghanistan is a volatile and high-risk zone which could discourage the 
western private sector to invest. According to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Index, Afghanistan ranks 164 out of 189 economies in the ease of 
doing business. What incentives could the Afghan government and the 
international community offer to attract the western private sector? 
 
4. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
II. Interviewee B 
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that some of the constraints 
facing Foreign Direct Investments are political instability, security, 
corruption, and lack of capacity. How could the government encourage 
investors and businesses to invest/continue investing in Afghanistan despite 
these challenges? 
 
2. What variables could prove to be successful in forming a Public Private 
Partnership? What challenges could prove to be obstacles in such an 
initiative? 
 
3. Many businesses are discouraged because of a lack of institutions providing 
line of credit and surety bonds. According to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Index, Afghanistan ranks 130 out of 189 economies in terms of 
getting credit. This could be an incentive to attract foreign businesses. What 





4. You have mentioned that to formalize the economy, more focus should be on 
SMEs. However, with a decline in foreign aid and increase in competition 
among businesses, some SMEs will be forced to closure and the political & 
security uncertainty will limit the growth of the others. How could such a 
program be made viable? 
 
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it 
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in 
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable 
development. What do you think are the underlying reasons for this lack of 
coordination? Do you see any improvements in this regard beyond 2014? 
 
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
III. Interviewee C 
1. It is argued that one of the reasons for the weaker government institutions and 
low capacity personnel is the exclusion of the government institutions from 
many, if not all, of the reconstruction and development projects implemented 
by the international community and development agencies, along with higher 
salaries offered by these organizations attracting qualified Afghans (as stated 
in the Development Cooperation Report of 2010). What are your thoughts on 
this subject? Is the international community responsible for the weaker 
government institutions and low capacity personnel? 
 
2. Could you provide an example of the ‘administrative bureaucracy’ you have 
mentioned in response to question 2? Do you think this issue will remain the 
same or improve beyond 2014? 
 
3. Stability programs such SIKA are contended to be less conducive to the 
overall development and economic prosperity of a region as they are to meet, 
mainly, military objectives (Development Cooperation Report of 2010, The 
Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery). What are your thoughts in this regard? 
Should the international community and the Afghan government continue 
supporting such programs? 
 
4. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that some developing programs 




What is the level of incoordination and communication between the 
government and the international community with respect to project/program 
design, planning, and implementation? What has been the impact of this on 
implemented projects/programs? 
 
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
IV. Interviewee D 
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that the government was not 
able to effectively utilize the foreign assistance since 2002. What do you think 
are the underlying reasons? Do you think this trend will change beyond 2014? 
 
2. As mentioned in your response to question 2, in addition to limited budget and 
security challenges, what other factors could hamper successful 
project/program implementation in the recent future? 
 
3. With all the challenges present in doing business in Afghanistan, as mentioned 
in your responses, how do you think the international community and the 
government could encourage the national and international private sector to 
invest/continue investing in Afghanistan? 
 
4. With a decline in businesses and available opportunities post-2014, as 
mentioned in your response to question 1, it could be inferred that the pool of 
qualified human capital will increase. What impact will this have on the 
government institutions and the international organizations, and their planned 
reconstruction and development programs/projects? 
 
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
V. Interviewee E 
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned that the investment risk is 
perceived fairly high and has made investors hesitant to make any 
commitments. Although, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Index, Afghanistan has been improving its business environment, how else do 
you think the Afghan government and the international community could 





2. What do you think are the underlying reasons for the incompetence and 
corruption of the government agencies, as mentioned in your response to 
question 2? Do you think there will be any improvements in this regard 
beyond 2014? 
 
3. The Afghan government has repeatedly asked for the donor funds to be 
channeled through the government agencies to build the much needed 
experience in order to take lead of the projects/programs in Afghanistan (DCR 
2010, DCR 2012). A significant reduction in the involvement of donors and 
stronger channeling of donor funds through government agencies, as 
mentioned in your response to question 2, could be interpreted as the 
government agencies having developed the capacity to handle these affairs. 
How effective do you think this change will be? What would be its impact on 
projects/programs in the recent future? 
 
4. With a reduced availability of contracts for international and national 
organizations, as mentioned in your response to question 2, it could be 
deduced that a pool of qualified human capital will become available in the 
market. Do you think there will be any difference in the planning, 
implementation, and handling of programs/projects by the government 
agencies and international community post-2014 with such a change? 
 
5. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of 
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the 
private sector? Do you see any improvements in this regard? 
 
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
VI. Interviewee F 
1. Would it be correct to say that one of the reasons there is very little western 
corporate interest in exploring Afghanistan is the lack of focus on and 
understanding the local business environment as has been mentioned in your 
response to question 1? How could the Afghan government and the 






2. The capacity of the Afghan government is said to be underdeveloped 
(Understanding Afghanistan, Falling Short). How effective do you think 
Public Private Partnerships would prove to be? What challenges would local 
or western private sectors face in such an initiative? 
 
3. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that the donor nations have 
trained the Afghan contractors and subcontractors to expect large sums of 
money for projects with low expectations. What are the underlying reasons for 
this action? What has been the outcome as a result? 
 
4. In a report by the International Crisis Group, it has been mentioned that a 
considerable portion of the aid has gone to waste because of poor 
programming, evaluation and oversight, corruption and strategic disconnect. 
Who would you say is responsible for this, the Afghan government or the 
donor community? Why? 
 
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it 
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in 
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable 
development. What do you think are the underlying reasons for this lack of 
coordination? Do you see any improvements in this regard beyond 2014? 
 
6. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
VII. Interviewee G 
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned lack of experienced national 
and international contractors as an obstacle. Afghanistan is a volatile and 
high-risk zone which could discourage many national and international 
companies to do business in. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Index, Afghanistan ranks 164 out of 189 economies in the ease of doing 
business. How do you think the Afghan government and the international 
community could encourage these businesses to work in Afghanistan? What 
incentives could attract them? 
 
2. Low quality of construction materials is mentioned as an issue, in your 
response to question 1. What measures could the government and private 





3. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of 
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the 
private sector? Do you see any improvements in this regard? 
 
4. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it 
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in 
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable 
development. How would you evaluate the coordination between the donor 
agencies themselves and the donor agencies and the government? How do you 
see the project/program planning and coordination between these two bodies 
i.e. the government and the international community/organizations beyond 
2014? 
 
5. If you had to portray the image of a post-2014 Afghanistan, what would it be? 
 
VIII. Interviewee H 
1. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of 
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the 
private sector? With skilled human resources mentioned as an issue in your 
response to question 1 and 2, what measures, in addition to the use of media 
and technology, could yield improvements in this regard?  
 
2. You have mentioned access to finance as an obstacle, in response to question 
1 and 2. However, based on a commercial guide to US companies prepared by 
the US Department of Commerce, there are US and non-US organizations 
such as OPIC, IFC, USTDA and so forth that provide access to finance to 
companies looking to start or grow their businesses in Afghanistan. How 
would you evaluate the services of these organizations in terms of business 
growth or program funding in Afghanistan? Are there any particular issues or 
limitations that could discourage businesses to use the services of these 
organizations?  
 
3. What kind of incentives do you think could attract more businesses and 
investors to Afghanistan? 
 





IX. Interviewee I 
1. In response to question 1, you have mentioned unavailability of the 
international organizations and consulting firms as potential obstacles due to, 
mainly, insecurity and lack of funds. How could the government and the 
international community encourage these organizations and firms to continue 
working in Afghanistan despite these challenges? What incentives could 
attract them? 
 
2. How would you evaluate the current management and technical skills of 
Afghan personnel working in the public sector against those working in the 
private sector? With technical human resources mentioned as an issue in your 
response to question 1, what measures could yield improvements in this 
regard?  
 
3. In response to question 2, you have mentioned that if the development trend 
becomes negative and the economic development gets slower, the country will 
face instability. How would you evaluate the role of the extractive industry in 
this regard which has been estimated in trillions of dollars? 
 
4. With the reduction of funds and downsizing of organizations and firms, it 
could be deduced that a pool of qualified human capital will become available 
in the market. How do you think will this development affect the output of the 
government and other local and international organizations? What changes 
could be expected in the implemented projects/programs? 
 
5. In the Development Cooperation Report of 2010 by the Ministry of Finance, it 
is stated that donor coordination is less than satisfactory, resulting in 
fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs, and unbalanced and inequitable 
development. How would you evaluate the coordination between the donor 
agencies themselves and the donor agencies and the government? How do you 
see the project/program planning and coordination between these two bodies 
i.e. the government and the international community/organizations beyond 
2014? 
 





Appendix C. Terms and Phrases Used by the Participants to Describe Issues  











1 International Private Sector Reduction in Aid Weaker Institutions Dependence on Aid Investment Risk 
2 Public Private Partnership Revenue Collection 
Qualified Human 
Capital Poor Economy Reluctance of Investors 
3 Corruption Political Instability Insecurity Incapacity of Government Down Turn in Economy 
4 Tax Reform Foreign Direct Investment 
Incapacity of 
Government Reluctance of Investors Reduction in Contracts 
5 Procurement Transparency Security Challenges 
Administrative 
Bureaucracy 





6 Credit Problems Corruption Lack of Communication (Donors) Security Challenges Corruption 
7 Lack of Development Budget Unemployment 







Lack of Law 
Enforcement Good Policies Instability/Insecurity 
9  Weak Law Enforcement  Lack of Planning (Govt) Political Risk Insurance 
10  Economic Growth  





Project Design Problems 
(Govt) Capacity Building 
12  
Weaker Govt. 
Institutions  Corruption 
Employment 
Opportunities 
13  Judiciary Reforms  




14      
15      

















1 Lack of Understanding the Business Environment Security Challenges Security Challenges Security Challenges 
2 US Corporate Interest Qualified Human Capital Qualified Human Capital Access Difficulty (Infrastructure) 
3 Lack of Funding Low Quality Material Resources Corruption Lack of Funding 
4 Lack of Legal Framework Government Capacity Access to Finance/Credit Qualified Human Capital 
5 Lack of Transparency Government Accountability Foreign Investment Lack of Material Resources 
6 Corruption Establishment of Factories  
Monitoring Problems 
(Consulting Firms) 
7 Public Private Partnership Incentives to Govt. Personnel  Economic Development 
8 Contractors Capacity Corruption  Unemployment 
9 Business Risk Donors Coordination  Instability 
10 Instability Education System  
Reduction in International 
Companies/Orgs 
11 Security Challenges   Government Capacity 
12 Enforcement of Law   Private Sector Investment 
13 Business Investment Reforms   Enacting Laws & Rules 
14 Government Function   Transparency (Govt) 
15    Increasing Domestic Revenues 
16    

































Government Reluctance of Investors Corruption 
Limited Budget of 
International Orgs. 
2 Insecurity Education System Lack of Planning 










Coordination International Private Sector 
Incentives to 










Institutions Credit Problems  Lack of Funding 
6   
Lack of Law 
Enforcement Investment Risk  
Reduction in International 
Companies/Orgs. 
7   
Incompetence of 
Government Instability   
8   
Weak Law 
Enforcement Political Risk Insurance   
9   
Weaker Govt. 
Institutions Political Instability   
10   
Government 
Capacity Foreign Direct Investment   
11   
Enacting Laws & 
Rules Access to Finance/Credit   
12   
Lack of Legal 
Framework Foreign Investment   




(Infrastructure)   
14   
Government 
Function Private Sector Investment   
15    
Low Quality Material 
Resources   
16    
Lack of Understanding the 
Business Environment   
























1 Dependence on Aid Business Investment Reforms 
Lack of 
Transparency Donors Coordination 
Qualified Individuals 
Leaving Country 
2 Lack of Understanding the Business Environment 
Legislative & 





3 US Corporate Interest Judiciary Reforms Government Function 
Lack of Coordination 
(Donors)  
4 Public Private Partnership Tax Reforms Government Accountability   
5 Business Investment Reforms Good Policies Enacting Laws & Rules   
6 Establishment of Factories  Transparency (Govt)   
7 Economic Development  Weak Law Enforcement   
8 Unemployment  Patronage   
9 Private Sector Investment  Administrative Bureaucracy   
10 Increasing Domestic Revenues  
Lack of Law 
Enforcement   
11 Foreign Investment  Procurement Transparency   
12 Revenue Collection  Accountability   
13 Economic Growth     
14 Down Turn in Economy     
15 Employment Opportunities     
16 Qualified Individuals Leaving Country     
17 Poor Economy     
 
